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ABSTRACT 
 
The Construction of Airfields during the New Georgia Campaign of 1943-44:  
Lessons Learned by the United States Naval Construction Battalions 
by 
Joseph C. Zimmerman, PE 
 
Prevalent depictions of United States Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) were engendered 
by John Wayne in The Fighting Seabees and the musical, South Pacific.  While capturing the 
ingenious determination that birthed their motto ‘Can Do’, these incomplete pictures don’t 
portray the complexity of construction under combat conditions in a harshly unforgiving and 
demanding environment. 
 
The Seabee’s first combat landing was New Georgia. In six months, these battalions built five 
airfields, granting Allied forces air superiority over the Solomon Islands and Rabaul. Battalion 
records stored at the Naval Facilities Command Archives, Port Heuneme, California, combined 
with documents from the National Archives, provided source materials. 
 
This thesis examines the construction operations undertaken at New Georgia that were the 
proving grounds from which future construction methodology stemmed. This campaign 
tempered the men, techniques, and equipment necessary for Pacific construction. The true heart 
of the Seabee’s was forged by the lessons learned at New Georgia. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The New Georgia Campaign in the Solomon Islands 
The Solomon Islands 
 In the years prior to 1942, the Solomon Islands were virtually unknown to the American 
public and, for all practical purposes, to the United States military.  This situation changed in 
1942 with the battle for Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands.  The battle for the 
Japanese-built airstrip, renamed by the United States Marines as Henderson Field, engaged 
American public attention as the only United States combat advance in the South Pacific during 
that year.  As a result, Americans learned a whole new lexicon of names and phrases, including 
“The Slot”, “PT-109”, and “Seabees”.  The battle for that jungle airfield also set the tone and the 
purpose for the subsequent Allied military activities in the Solomon Islands and in the Southwest 
Pacific Theater of operations.  The objective of these military operations was the capture or 
construction of airbases, including ones on New Georgia, for the sole purpose of advancing 
Allied Air Power to neutralize the Japanese base at Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago, the key 
to Japanese power in the South Pacific. 
 The Solomon Islands themselves form a double chain of parallel islands running 
southeast from the Bismarck Archipelago toward the New Hebrides Islands for approximately 
six hundred miles from 5° to 11° south of the Equator.  The navigable channel formed by the 
double row of islands – the New Georgia Sound - became know as “The Slot”.  The islands are 
volcanic in origin with steep mountainous interiors covered with dense jungle and surrounded by 
extensive coral reef systems.   Flat and cultivatable ground on these islands is rare and in the 
1940s these spots were the locations of the native population administrative centers or the 
location of plantations owned and operated by a variety of European companies or Christian 
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missions.  These locations also became the logical choices for airfield construction for both the 
Japanese and Allied war efforts.  The primary inhabitants of these islands are Melanesian 
peoples along with a small representation of Europeans and Chinese, these later two groups 
located at administrative and trading centers in the islands and at plantations. 
Two different governments administered the seven main island groups that compose the 
Solomon Islands before the war.  Seven of these island groups, including Guadalcanal and the 
New Georgia Group, were part of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, headquartered at 
Tulagi Island.  The remaining island group in the chain, Bougainville, administratively belonged 
to the Australian New Guinea Mandate established from former German possessions after World 
War I. 1 
The New Georgia Group 
The New Georgia Group consists of the several large islands and numerous small islands 
and extends from meridian 156° to meridian 158°.  The central island of the group is New 
Georgia, with the islands of Vangunu and Gatukai to the southeast and the larger islands of 
Kolombangara and Vella Lavella to the northwest.  Rendova Island and Tetipari Island lie just 
south of the New Georgia Island proper while Arundel, Wanawana, Gizo, and Ganongga Islands 
extend on the same northwesterly direction just south of Kolombangara and Vella Lavella.   
Barrier reefs protect most of New Georgia Island and between the reefs and the island are 
formed some of the largest lagoons in the world.  Roviana Lagoon lies immediately south of 
New Georgia and is accessed from the north through the Diamond Narrows or from the west 
across the Munda Bar.  These features control access to the area around Munda Point with the 
only other access to Roviana Lagoon being at high tide through Onaiavisi Entrance between 
Sasavele and Baraulu Islands, thus allowing only small craft to carry supplies over two miles 
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down the lagoon.  The crossing of the Munda Bar, a line of reefs to the west, was difficult and 
only possible for small sailing craft and canoes at high tide following a complicated set of sailing 
instructions provided by plantation personnel from New Georgia.2  The area of New Georgia 
around Munda Point was the location of a Methodist Mission, Kokengolo Mission.  Adjoining 
this was the Lambeti Plantation, owned by Les Gill which was a coconut plantation.  The 
Japanese airstrip that became the scene for much of the fighting on New Georgia was built on the 
site of the Kokengolo Mission Plantation and the Americans would later extend this airstrip onto 
the Lambeti Plantation. 
Like the rest of the Solomon Islands, New Georgia’s mountainous interior is covered in 
dense jungle and was invariably described by service histories as “hot, humid, and unhealthy.”  
The predominant weather pattern in the islands is a wet season in November through December 
with a peak rainfall expected in December and a dry season that runs from roughly April through 
October.  However, with rainfall that can average over 200 inches per year in the mountains and 
150 inches along the coast, the term “dry season” became relatively meaningless to most 
Americans who served there.  The islands also “lie in the only latitudes in the world where 
evaporation is greater over land than over water.”  New Georgia was a place where heat and 
humidity, combined with insects and disease, added a whole new dimension to both combat and 
construction operations.3 
The ELKTON Plan 
Operation CARTWHEEL  
 The planning for operations against the Japanese at Rabaul commenced as part of the 
Joint Chiefs Directive of 2 July 1942. 4  The Pacific Theater of Operation was divided into 
Pacific Ocean Areas under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, headquartered at Pearl Harbor, and 
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South West Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur, headquartered in Brisbane, Australia.  
This 2 July 1943 Directive initiated a three-part limited advance against the Japanese.  Part One 
consisted of the capture of Tulagi and the Japanese Airfield at Guadalcanal and, under the code 
name WATCHTOWER, dominated the remainder of 1942.  Part Two covered the capture of 
Lae, Salamaua, and Northeast New Guinea as well as the capture of the remainder of the 
Solomon Islands, and Part Three dealt with the capture of Rabaul on New Britain Island.5 
Planning for the second phase began in early 1943 with the Casablanca Conference that 
set the priorities for Allied military objectives for the year.  The decisions from Casablanca 
maintained the limited offensive style of operations in the Pacific under the “Germany first” 
policy.   Before the Casablanca Conference, the Joint Chiefs had instructed MacArthur to present 
plans to carry out the remaining parts of the 2 July 1942 Directive.  These plans were submitted 
as ELKTON I, dated 12 February 1943, with the stated objective of achieving Parts 2 and 3 of 
the 2 July 1942 Directive.    It soon became apparent that these plans would need some detailed 
explanation, so the Joint Chiefs and members from MacArthur’s, Nimitz’s, and Admiral William 
Halsey, Jr.’s staff convened in Washington for a series of meetings to become known as the 
Pacific Military Conference which opened on 12 March 43.  MacArthur’s representative brought 
the revised ELKTON II plans dated 28 February 1943 to this conference.   These plans were 
accepted and formed the basis for a converging two pronged assault on Rabaul with one prong 
moving up the Solomons and one moving along the coast of New Guinea.   However, there were 
insufficient forces from all branches available due to the obligations of Casablanca and overall 
war strategy to carry out MacArthur’s plans as specified in ELKTON II.  Therefore, 
modifications were made to the plan that limited the scope of operations for 1943 to the basic 
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objective of Part Two of the previous 2 July 1942 Directive. These objectives were set fourth in 
the 28 March 43 Directive of the Joint Chiefs that closed the Pacific Military Conference.6 
The plan adopted by the Joint Chiefs with modifications was incorporated as ELKTON 
III, dated 26 April 1943.   The final plans for CARTWHEEL in 1943 called for the seizure of 
Woodlark and Kirawina for airbase locations, along with the capture of the Solomons up to 
southern Bougainville and the capture of Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea.  This would be a 
joint operation between South Pacific Forces under Admiral Halsey and South West Pacific 
Forces under General MacArthur, with overall command belonging to MacArthur for the portion 
of Halsey’s command operating in the Solomon Islands.  The Joint Chiefs 28 March 1943 
Directive also confirmed the nature of CARTWHEEL to be one of advancement of air power as 
the primary role and this became more pronounced as 1943 progressed.  All the targets for 
CARTWHEEL in 1943 were airbases or forward airbase locations for the capture, later changed 
to neutralization, of Rabaul.  
TOENAILS 
Concurrent with MacArthur’s preparation of ELKTON, Brigadier General DeWitt Peck, 
USMC, Commander South Pacific (COMSOPAC) War Plans Officer on Admiral Halsey’s staff, 
prepared the draft plans for the invasion of the New Georgia Group called Operation 
TOENAILS.  The TOENAILS plan was actually presented to the Joint Chiefs in January of 1943 
and was accepted into the overall plan of Operation CARTWHEEL.  A meeting between Halsey 
and MacArthur in Brisbane, Australia, after the Pacific Military Conference set the operational 
date for the invasion of New Georgia for 15 May 1943.  This date was pushed back to 30 June 
1943 to coincide with MacArthur’s movements in New Guinea and the landings at Woodlark and 
Kirawina, effectively making 30 June 1943 the “D-Day” for CARTWHEEL Operations.7 
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  The TOENAILS operation was centered on Task Force 31 commanded by Rear Admiral 
Richmond K. Turner.  Task Force 31 was broken down into the Eastern and Western Forces and 
the Occupation Forces under Major General John W. Hester, United States Army.  Hester’s 
forces were organized into three groups, consisting of the Western Landing Force, the Eastern 
Landing Force, and the New Georgia Air Command. The primary mission of the Western Force 
was the capture of the Munda Point Airstrip. The 24th Naval Construction Battalion (NCB) was 
assigned to the landing force for D-Day to assist with operations.  The Western landing force 
under Hester’s direct command was divided into the Southern and Northern Landing Groups.  
The majority of the Western Force was with the Southern group, whose objective was the 
capture of Rendova Island and then a shore-to-shore movement to Munda for the capture of the 
air field at Munda Point.  The Northern Group was to land on the north coast of Munda at Rice 
Anchorage with the assigned objective of capturing Bairoko Harbor to prevent Japanese 
reinforcement of Munda.   
The Eastern Landing Force was to capture Viru Harbor, Wickham Anchorage, and Segi 
Point.  Segi Point was to be taken for the construction of a forward airfield to provide fighter 
coverage for the assault on Munda Point.  The 47th NCB as part Acorn 7, a naval airfield setup 
and operation unit, was assigned to build the airstrip at Segi Point and was scheduled to land 
with the Marines of the 4th Raider Battalion on D-Day, 30 Jun 1943.   
 Starting in February of 1943, numerous advance amphibious scouting patrols made 
reconnaissance of the New Georgia Group.  Most of these groups came in and out of New 
Georgia through Segi Point.  The Markham Plantation at Segi Point was the headquarters of 
Donald Kennedy, District Officer for the Western Solomons and a key member of the coast 
watchers.  Kennedy had set up a small group of natives under his command to harass the 
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Japanese as well as to report on their movement through the coast watcher system.  Kennedy and 
other coast watchers assisted Marine reconnaissance patrols into the islands until the landings.  It 
was from these patrols that it was determined that while Segi would make a good location for an 
airfield, it was unsuitable for major landings for a move against Munda on the other end of the 
island.  Due to enemy pressure against Kennedy’s position at Segi and fear of losing the 
advantage of landings in a secured area, initial landings at Segi were moved forward from 30 Jun 
to 21 June 1943, initiating the combat phase of the TOENAILS operation.8 
 TOENAILS had a different purpose and overall object than the operation of the previous 
year.  The Navy’s handling of Guadalcanal had been soundly criticized by General Millard F. 
Harmon, commanding General U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, to the extent that he 
felt the “the plan did not have its first and immediate objective the seizure and development of 
CACTUS as an airbase” and that the Navy “failed to appreciate the importance of airfield 
construction.”9  In theory, the Navy had listened to Harmon’s observations. This coincided with 
the nature of the CARTWHEEL operations being directed at the use of air power to isolate 
Rabaul.  Therefore, provisions were made for landing airfield and other construction elements 
directly with the Army and Marine Corps combat units on D-Day. 
Seabees, Acorns, and Cubs 
 The NCB, known as CBs or Seabees, were formed after Pearl Harbor and the loss of 
civilian contractor construction crews on Guam and Wake Island.  Their purpose was to perform 
construction under hostile conditions and under potential enemy fire. For this purpose, trained 
and experienced construction and trades professionals such as carpenters, welders, and 
equipment operators were given military training to conduct construction activities in combat 
zones.  Units had been active in the Pacific since 1942 and had previously served with great 
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distinction in getting Henderson Field on Guadalcanal operational under constant enemy action.  
With the TOENAILS operation NCBs were slated to go in with the combat forces on “D-Day” in 
order to overcome some of the problems encountered with the earlier operations on Guadalcanal.  
This was to be the first such combat landing of a naval construction battalion, preceding that in 
Sicily by just a few days.   
 U.S. Navy Construction Battalions were originally to have a complement of 
approximately 27 Officers and 1052 men of varying enlisted rank.10  Their bill of equipment 
varied from unit to unit, depending on date organized and movement overseas for operation.  
There were three battalions slated for the 30 June 1943 landings as part of TOENAILS.  The 24th 
NCB was assigned to Western Landing Force to help secure the beaches for the Rendova 
Landings and proceed with repairs to the airfield at Munda once it was captured.  One half of the 
20th NCB was to land with the Eastern Landing Force to build PT bases and assist with the 
landings at Viru Harbor and Wickham Anchorage.  The remaining unit was the 47th NCB, which 
was to land at Segi Point to build an airfield.  Acorn and Cub were terms assigned respectively 
for a small air base and a large naval base and these designations were created for the purpose of 
supply organization and transfer to advance base depots.   The 47th NCB was assigned to Acorn 
7 and it was under the unit designation of Acorn 7 that the 47th was ordered to land at Segi.11  
During the course of the New Georgia campaign several other NCBs, either attached to an 
Acorns, Cub 3, or assigned individually, were sent to the New Georgia group to build one or 
more of the five airfields completed on the islands. 
 For the most part, these were supply and administration designations and not related to 
command structure.  An Acorn would consist of all units assigned to the airfield to be built, 
including NCBs, Aviation Units, and Combat Aviation Service Units (CASUs).  For the same 
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purpose, a Cub was a naval base planed for approximately one-quarter the size of Pearl Harbor 
(Pearl Harbor size bases were designated Lion).12 All units assigned to the Segi Point Airstrip on 
New Georgia were under the umbrella of Acorn 7.   The activities at Segi on New Georgia were 
the only instance where a single NCB worked on a single project keeping the lines between NCB 
and Acorn related construction activities from blurring.  The facilities at Munda became 
associated with Cub 3 and with Acorn 8.  For the majority of this thesis only the activities of the 
individual NCBs will be reviewed, as Acorn files are not stored with the NCB records at the 
Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) Archive. 
 Major John N. Rentz, United State Marine Corps historian, sums up the battle field at 
New Georgia with his statement that the “allies would battle not only a human enemy but also 
tropical heat, omnivorous jungle and unceasing rain…”13  Brian Altobello and Eric Hammel 
have described in detail the Army and Marine Corps battle with the Japanese in the heat and 
omnivorous jungle.  What follows here is the detailed account of the Seabees battle with the 
islands themselves while facing the same terrible conditions that bred disease and exhaustion in 
equal amounts.  A battle against timetables where victory was not measured in territory gained 
measured by distance but by amounts of earth and material moved.  It was a battle where the 
opponent was not always another man but was nature itself.  The purpose of the entire New 
Georgia campaign and the umbrella CARTWHEEL operation was to gain air superiority over the 
Solomon Islands and Rabaul.  For that purpose the Seabees built five airfields in New Georgia 
between July 1943 and January 1944, one each at Segi and Munda, two at Ondonga, and one on 
Vella Lavella. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SEGI 
Segi Plantation Airfield 
Segi Landings 
The first objective of the TOENAILS operation to be achieved was the seizure of the 
Markham plantation at Segi Point on the southeastern tip of New Georgia Island.  This area was 
the base of operation for Coastwatcher Donald G. Kennedy.  Kennedy and his small force of 
native scouts used the plantation and its environs as a base of operations not only to report 
Japanese naval and aviation movements but also to carry out raids against the Japanese.  The first 
Marine Scouting party landed by a Catalina Fly Boat (PBY) at Segi on March 21, 1943.1  
Between this first party and the landing on D-Day on June 30, 1943, there were numerous 
scouting parties and groups that came into New Georgia through Segi.  Thus, this area was well 
known to the Allies before the start of the TOENAILS landing, and Segi Point was designated to 
be an airfield for the support of the main thrust against Munda from the inception of the modified 
plans for the operation. 
The landing forces assigned to Segi Point, code named BLACKBOY, were organized as 
part of the Eastern Landing Force commanded by Colonel D.H. Hammond, USA.  The initial 
units assigned to the Eastern Landing Force were the U.S. Army103rd Infantry, less the 2nd and 
3rd Battalions, along with Batteries A, F, and the 1st platoon of E of the 70th Coastal Artillery.  
Attached to the landing force were the Naval Base Units and Acorn 7.  Acorn 7 consisted of all 
Naval Units necessary to construct, operate, and conduct flight operations from a small airfield.  
Assigned to Acorn 7 for the construction of the Segi Point airfield was the 47th NCB. 
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The landings at Segi Point where scheduled to take place on June 30, 1943, to coincide 
with the coordinated landings of the remainder of the Eastern Landing Force and the Western 
Landing force.  These plans were altered in mid June when the Japanese stepped up their 
attempts to neutralize Kennedy’s position in response to his raiding activities.  Kennedy 
requested reinforcement from Admiral Turner who received the request some time on the night 
of the 18th of June.  In response to this request, the timetable for the assault on Segi was moved 
up to the 21st of June.  The assignment of reinforcing Kennedy was given to the 4th Marine 
Raider Battalion under Lt. Col. M.S. Currin, less two companies assigned to the assault on Viru 
Harbor.  Providing reinforcement for Currin’s unit were Companies A and D of the 103rd 
Infantry US Army.  Currin’s force arrived off of Segi Point on the evening of June 20th and, 
though they had some difficulty with navigating the channel, Currin and his men landed at 
approximately 0550 hours on the 21st where they met no Japanese resistance.  Instead they were 
greeted as they came ashore by Seabees of the 47th NCB.  The army units of the 103rd, along with 
a 47th NCB survey party, landed on the morning of June 22nd.2 
The Organization of the 47th NCB  
The 47th NCB was commissioned at Camp Bradford, Naval Construction Training Center 
(NCTC), Nob Fork, Virginia, on 7 December 1942.   After commissioning, the battalion was 
transferred to Camp Peary, Virginia and from there they were sent to the Advanced Base Depot 
(ABD), Port Hueneme, California, on 10 January 1943.  While stationed at Port Hueneme, the 
47th underwent “considerable amphibious training” and was assigned to Acorn 7 on 1 February 
1943 and departed for overseas on 23 Apr 1943.  The unit first arrived at Noumea, New 
Caledonia on 13 May.3  The battalion was then staged to Banika in the Russell Islands to assist 
with the airfield construction projects already underway.  The unit was fully staffed and 
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equipped when it arrived in Noumea with a full contingent of 27 officers and 1,052 enlisted 
personnel.  Lt. Commander John S. Lyles, experienced in airfield construction including the Will 
Rogers Airport in Oklahoma City, was in command of the 47th at the time of its initial 
deployment to Segi.4 
The Reconnaissance of Segi Point 
As part of the build-up to the landings at Segi Point, additional officers and non-
commissioned personnel were assigned to Acorn 7 and the 47th NCB to assist with the 
reconnaissance of Segi.  On or about 15 Jun 1943, Commander W.L. Painter, CEC, was 
transferred to Acorn 7 from Commander Air Forces South Pacific (COMAIRSOPAC) along with 
Lieutenants F. E. Swanson, G. S. Tinsley, and W. T. Maley from the 5th Naval Construction 
Regiment. At the same time twenty petty officers from the 5th Construction Regiment were also 
slated to be transferred to Acorn 7 but their transfers never took place.5   Commander Painter 
along with the other Civil Engineering officers were transferred to Acorn 7 as part of the 
preliminary plan for the Segi fighter strip ordered by Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, 
COMAIRSOPAC, on 28 May 1943.6 
Commander Painter, referred to as “Wild Bill,” was something of a well-known figure in 
the South Pacific.  He served on Vice Admiral John S. McCain’s staff as an engineering advising 
officer.  Huey refers to him as an “all around engineering handyman for Admirals McCain, 
Turner and Halsey.”  Commander Painter also performed a reconnaissance of Viru Harbor and 
Segi in early May 1943 with the assistance of the Coastwatchers for an airfield location prior to 
commencement of the TOENAILS operations.7  Painter’s reconnaissance report for the May trip 
is included as an attachment to the preliminary plans for Segi.  Painter inspected the area of Viru 
Harbor and dismissed it as an airfield location due to heavy clay soil that from experience with 
 21
similar material would be unworkable in wet weather and a lack of sufficient coral for surfacing 
of airfields and roads at the site.  The site at Segi was chosen because workable coral for 
surfacing was available along with an area for a 3,500 foot strip with water approaches. This site 
would require “some blasting” and “very little grading” to prepare the subgrade for placement of 
an airfield in this location.  Painter’s report ends with recommendations for a follow-up survey to 
mark beach approaches for navigation and to survey the site and prepare engineering drawings 
prior to landing with emphasis on drainage necessary to work this site in wet weather.8  
Commander Painter’s arrival, however, appeared to have caused a disturbance in Commander 
Lyles’ 47th NCB organizational structure. 
  As detailed in the reports of the 47th NCB, the first reconnaissance of the area around 
Segi Point by members of the 47th NCB took place on 14 June 1943 when a party consisting of 
two army officers and Lt. R. L. Ryan, CEC of the 47th NCB arrived at Segi “under orders from 
task force headquarters” to survey the Segi Point area.  Commander Painter along with 
Lieutenants Swanson, Tinsley, Maley, and four enlisted men arrived at Segi on 22 June 1943 
along with the units of the 103rd Infantry sent to relieve Kennedy.  According to the 47th monthly 
report for July, Lt. Ryan turned his information on Segi over to Painter and returned to the 
battalion by PBY on the 25th of June.  Painter and his detachment “surveyed the area, located the 
air strip and taxiways, marked the limits of clearing and selected and marked landing points for 
ships.”9  The US Army commanding officer of the reconnaissance party of 14 June put Lt. Ryan 
in for a commendation based on his work at Segi prior to Painter’s arrival for his assessment of 
“tides, beaches, water supply, construction of air strip, location of coral and plan of drainage.”10   
 The arrival of Currin on 21 Jun 43 precipitated one of the most famous Seabee incidents 
released to the press by the Navy during World War II.  This is the famous greeting of the 
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Marines by the Seabees as they came ashore in Higgins boats to reinforce Kennedy.  According 
to the press release dated 31 Aug 44, when Currin and his men landed on the beach, he was 
greeted with the famous quote of “Colonel, the Seabees are always happy to welcome the 
Marines.”  It is unknown from documentation in the record files if this was staged because 
Currin was very aware of the survey party with the remainder of his command to land the next 
day, or if this was Lt. Ryan just having some fun at the expense of the Marines.11   
Lt. Ryan’s famous greeting aside, Commander Lyles was not very happy to have 
Commander Painter assigned to the operation.  Though Lyles is very complementary of the 
engineering and professional skills of Commander Painter and the other officers sent from 
COMAIRSOPAC and the 5th NCR, he is very, if politely, vocal about his opinion that their 
presence was an unnecessary impediment to efficient battalion operation.  Commander Painter 
was detached from the 47th back to COMAIRSOPAC on 18 July and the four officers from 5th 
NCR were detached to their previous command on 4 August.  Commander Lyles notes that these 
officers “did a good job and their help was appreciated” but he felt that their inclusion “to the 
battalion just before it started its first real job seriously disrupted the organization.”   Lyles felt 
that the 47th “could have done at least as good a job if the officers” in question had not been 
added to the battalion causing “organizational difficulties.”  He felt so strongly about this that he 
reiterated these statement the following month in the monthly report for August.12  It must be 
noted, however, that not counting Painter’s first scouting trip to Segi, this area was surveyed by 
two NCB details for sixteen days prior to the first piece of equipment landing on June 30. 
The plan for Segi Plantation from Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force called for the 
strip to be 3,600 feet long and 150 feet wide with 50-foot shoulders.  The surface of the strip was 
to be a minimum of eight inches of compacted crushed coral and there were to be 300 feet of 
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cleared area around the field.   Approaches to each end of the field were also to be cleared.  The 
items in the first priority group in the order of construction at Segi was to construct “perimeter 
roads” to access the area and “slit trenches” for personnel protection.  These were to be followed 
by equipment dispensary locations and then the completion of the first 1,800 feet of runway and 
one taxi loop to allow emergency operation and refueling of fighter aircraft as soon as possible.  
After this, the rest of the field and taxi loops followed by fuel tank farms with dispersal areas and 
material dispersal areas were to be completed.  The second priority group was the construction of 
camp facilities for 250 ground crew and approximately 150-flight crew of officers and enlisted 
men.  This was to be followed by underground operations rooms, radio communications, field 
lighting, and radar installation.  The third and fourth priority groups were the completion of 
second and third taxiways.  The original plan calls for 40 hardstands, surfaced aircraft parking, 
and a 100,000-gallon supply of aviation gasoline and corresponding lubrication oil and a 500,000 
round supply of 50 caliber ammunition be maintained in supply at the base.13 
Construction - Segi Point - June and July 1943 
 The first group of the 47th NCB landed at Segi Point in one Landing Ship, Tank (LST) at 
1010 hours on 30 June.  This first group consisted of 17 officers and 477 men and by 1300 hours 
on 30 June they had already started clearing the work area for the Segi Airfield and working on 
defensive revetments.  The work zone was laid out and staked by the survey party prior to the 
landing.  Even as the 47th landed at Segi on D-Day, it was already at less that one hundred 
percent strength.  During the months of May and June the unit had been at Noumea, Guadalcanal 
and the Russell Islands and had suffered personnel losses due directly to the nature of the tropics.  
During the month of June alone, the battalion had lost 511 sick days for disease and injury with 
298 days of the total lost to malaria.14  Though this represents an approximate loss of only 1.5% 
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of the man days available from the potential of the full 1,052 man and 27 officer contingent, it is 
representative of the trend that continued through combat and construction operations.15   
 The efforts of the 47th during the month of July were concentrated on the airstrip and 
roads necessary to move supplies and equipment to the construction area from the beach.  During 
this phase of the construction at Segi the weather was far from cooperative with only five clear 
days reported during a period of “nearly continuous rains” from 1 July to 17 July, although there 
is no indication of the amount of rainfall recorded by the 47th.   The rainfall abated from the 18th 
through the 25th of July but during the last six days of the month the heavy rains returned.   These 
rains made working with the locally available soil material difficult due to the high clay 
content.16 
 The reports indicate that coral of building quality was “scarce” in the vicinity of Segi and 
the material that was available had a high clay content.  The coral in the immediate vicinity of 
Segi was described as “of a very poor quality and… not believed to be at all representative of the 
coral generally found in the South-west Pacific.” The Seabees describe the coral as being in two 
varieties; that “found beneath a layer of overburden of earth and vegetative mater” and that 
found “adjacent to the shoreline.”  The coral material removed from underneath overburden 
contained fines, fine particulate materials and organics, that the Seabees refer to as “clay.”  This 
clay material caused compaction and surfacing problems and was also attributed with hardening 
problems. To deal with this issue, the Seabees found a way to reduce the clay content as 
described by Chief Carpenter’s Mate M. E. Milone.17  
 The method Milone describes was developed to accommodate for the conditions at Segi 
and the equipment and means available at the site.  The poor quality coral material, once 
excavated from the coral pit, was dumped on the construction site and spread by bulldozer in 
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layers to form a subgrade.  The bulldozers then were used to ‘walk’ over the finished subgrade 
layer to compact and break up any large pieces as needed before surfacing.  A sheepsfoot roller, 
a large rotating toothed drum roller, was then used to compact the layer. The action of walking 
the sheepsfoot over the compacting layer would bring water and ‘mud’, fines and impurities, to 
the surface of the worked layer.  This is similar to the technique of floating concrete to bring 
cement to the surface for finishing.  In the case of the water and mud brought to the surface a 
‘motor-patrol,’ or road grader, was used to scrape off the impurities.  This placement of layers 
with compaction by sheepsfoot roller and removal of mud was continued until final grade was 
reached.  After the final grade was motor-patrolled, the surface allowed to dry, as practical in the 
climate, until only enough moisture remained to allow working of the material.  The surface was 
then dressed with a road roller or smooth drum roller.  If more mud was brought to the surface by 
the roller, it was removed by motor patrol and the process repeated until no more mud comes up 
and the surface was hard and smooth. 
 The activity of construction on the airfield at Segi continued 24-hours a day with 
construction operations being conducted under floodlights until 18 July 1943.  Japanese air raids 
after the 18th limited night operations in conjunction with the fact that the airfield was in 
operation by that time.  During the remainder of July, the remaining portion of the 47th arrived 
from the Russells so that by 31 July only seven officers and one hundred eighteen men remained 
in the Russells with another officer and five enlisted men stationed at Koli Point, Guadalcanal 
with the battalion vital records.  This left a working force of twenty-three officers, included in 
this number are the three officers from 5th NCR, and nine hundred twenty-seven men during the 
month of July.  
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 Of the man power available during July at Segi, there were 362  man days lost due to 
illness and injuries with an additional 114 man days lost when factoring in the personnel in the 
Russells.  As with the figures for June, the single largest contributing factor was malaria with 
212 total sick days lost in total.  Injuries only accounted for 56 days between both groups.  
Included with this list of injuries was one man injured during the first Japanese air raid against 
Segi Point on 13 July 1943 with the rest being construction related.  This is again a consistent 
1.5% loss in manpower with the addition of two men removed from the roster and transferred to 
rear area for “war neurosis”.18   
The first Japanese air raid occurred at Segi on 13 July almost two weeks after start of 
construction under floodlights.  This air raid injured one sailor and destroyed most of the 
dynamite belonging to the 47th which limiting their jungle clearing activities and also damaged 
several pieces of equipment that had to be repaired but were put back into operation during July.   
The air raids added a great deal of stress to the men and an observation about the constant mental 
strain on the men due to air raid warnings and air raids after the 18th is attributed as the cause.  It 
was noted that it was extremely difficult for the equipment operator to hear the existing air raid 
siren system and it was recommended that a new louder self-powered siren be used to allow 
equipment operators to hear it along with “proper radar protection.” 
The airfield at Segi was deemed “suitable for operations” on 9 July and aircraft were 
expected on the 10th but did not land due to bad weather.  The first landing was an emergency 
landing by an F4U Corsair on 11 July and the field went into continuous operation on 13 July.  
The field was usable at 150 feet wide with a length 3,300 feet by the end of the month with 25 
hardstands almost complete and two taxiways under construction.  Two miles of road were 
completed and only one of those miles was considered adequately surfaced.  One permanent 
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dock and two temporary docks were constructed and only 50% of permanent camp structures 
including mess and quarters for men and officers were complete.  The unit had it sawmill up and 
running by the end of July and the operations building were under construction.  Commander 
Lyles estimated that all essential work on the final 3,500-foot strip would be completed on 
schedule by 30 September 1943. 
Construction - Segi Point - August 1943 
The month of August showed a steady decline in the health of men and their equipment 
in the tropical heat and humidity.  Part of this problem was dictated by the necessity of getting 
the airfield operational, and in the monthly report for August acting Officer in Charge (OiC) 
Lieutenant Commander Swanson acknowledged that “everything was subordinate to the 
principle project” including the drainage and camp construction.  One of the casualties of this 
pace of activity and location was Commander Lyles who was transferred to the rear for medical 
treatment on 5 August and transferred from the rear by ship to a US Naval Hospital in the USA 
on 25 August.   
He was one of sixty-four men transferred out of the battalion for medical reasons during 
August, a month that saw only one enemy bombing raid producing only “slight” damage and no 
personnel casualties.  Also during August there were 329 days lost due to illness and injury, with 
malaria again being the consistent leader, with other various tropical conditions and fevers 
following closely behind.  There were also 54 days lost to burns and injuries from construction 
and camp related activities.  With 988 men present for duty, this represents a slight increase in 
manpower available for work from the previous two months.  This agrees with Lt. Commander 
Swanson’s assessment that “most men evacuated for medical reasons were men whose physical 
condition was very poor when they entered the service” and that the “battalion’s experience 
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indicates it would be beneficial to raise the physical requirements of enlistment in the Sea Bees, 
particularly the dental requirements.”  The last was for eleven men in sick bay for dental 
abscesses.19   
 The conditions were also taking a toll on the equipment of the 47th with the monthly 
report for August showing that only 55% of the original equipment was available for 
construction work at Segi, due to transferred, broken and under repair equipment.  Table 1 from 
the 47th NCB’s August report shows the status of their equipment as of 31 August 1943. 
Table 1 – August Equipment Status 47th NCB 
Description of 
Equipment 
Amount 
Originally 
Received 
Converted 
Equipment 
Transferred  
Out 
Beyond 
Repair 
Repaired 
in 4 Days 
Available 
For Work 
¾ Yard Shovel 4 0 0 0 1 3
D8 Bulldozers 8 0 2 0 0 6
TD18 Bulldozers 8 0 4 1 0 3
Dump Trucks 26 1 6 7 4 8
Cargo Trucks 30 1 1 4 4 20
Carryall Scrapers 8 0 6 0 0 2
Jeeps 22 0 2 0 4 16
Water Trucks 2 0 0 0 1 1
Ditch Diggers 1 0 1 0 0 0
Patrol Graders 2 0 0 0 0 2
TD Grader 1 0 0 0 0 1
Rollers (Tandem) 2 0 0 0 1 1
Rollers 2 0 1 0 0 1
Rock Crusher 1 0 0 0 0 1
Air Compressors 3 0 0 0 0 3
1 ½ Ton Int. 1 1 0 0 0 0
Stump Pullers 4 0 0 0 0 4
 
The equipment listed as “beyond repair” was so listed because it had an “essential part broken” 
that was unavailable and could not be manufactured by the battalion.  Those listed as transferred 
out were sent to either Enogi Inlet or Munda.  The equipment listed as “repaired in 4 day” was 
equipment whose damaged or broken parts could be manufactured by the battalion.  Swanson 
lamented that spare parts were only being obtained “by sending men back to large rear area bases 
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for them” and that “anything that can be done to expedite delivery of parts and material to 
advance bases will be a tremendous help to the war effort.”20 
 During August, the entire company of the 47th, including the last of the men in the 
Russells and the Disbursing Officer and his men from Koli Point, were moved to Segi.  
However, by the end of the month one detachment of four men and two D8 bulldozers were 
detached to Enogi Inlet and a detachment of four officers and 193 men were transferred to 
Munda with the listed transferred equipment to assist with the completion of the Munda Airfield.  
This left twenty-one officers and 727 men at Segi.  The acting commander estimated the 
remaining projected work for the 3,500 foot airstrip would be completed by 31 October 1943, 
based on manpower losses to injury, illness, and transfer.  This is a delay of one month from the 
original completion date. 
 At the end of the month of August, the 47th NCB had completed twenty-three 
construction projects, including most of the operations buildings for the aviation units, airfield 
control building, and support facilities.  The Segi airfield itself was still considered only 87% 
complete with three taxi loops and associated hard-stands in varying stages of completion.  There 
were twenty-eight construction projects still ongoing at Segi including the airfield, with major 
emphasis outside the airfield being placed on road construction.  Approximately 5,500 feet of 
roads were coraled and compacted to ‘all-weather’ standard with between two and nine feet of 
coral required to allow the road to be considered passable for equipment in wet conditions.  An 
additional 5,100 feet of roads constructed in July were rough graded but were “practically 
impassable” until they could be coraled.21 
Other operations were additions and improvements to camp facilities, a hospital and 
water system. The battalion sawmill was producing 6,000 board feet per day on average and 
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could not keep up with demand.  Proposed projects were recreation facilities, an ammunition 
dump, and battalion offices.  The weather during August also continued to be an issue for 
construction.  No details of rainfall were indicated by the 47th NCB, however, the 2nd Echelon of 
the 20th NCB at Viru Harbor immediately up the coast of New Georgia from Segi erected a rain 
gauge on the 11th of August and recorded 21.3 inches of rain between the 11th and the 31st of 
August with 6.2 inches in 24 hours on the night of the 11th-12th.22 
Construction - Segi Point - September 1943 
  During the month of September the 47th continued to upgrade the Segi fighter strip 
extending the length to 3,450 feet by September 30th. This work was carried out by 780 men, 
approximately 80% of the battalion’s strength, with the remainder being at Munda to assist with 
construction of the Munda air facilities.  Work on the Segi strip continued on a 24-hour basis 
during September to insure completion of the October deadline.  With work on the airfield 
nearing completion, attention was turned to completing infrastructure.  Four thousand eight-
hundred feet of road was surfaced to all weather condition, bringing the total all weather surfaced 
road network at Segi to approximately 10,300 feet with only 1,600 feet of the remaining primary 
roadway needing to be surfaced. Comments were that much drainage work needed to be 
completed to keep roads in good condition but this was being delayed until all road surfacing 
work was completed. 
 New docking facilities were completed and the original docking facilities were improved 
upon and a 30-ton marine railway was installed and in near continuous use, supplemented by two 
3x7 self-propelled pontoon barges.  The battalion’s sawmill was still only producing an average 
of 5,000 board feet of lumber daily, although this amount was not near enough to meet the 
demand, causing lumber to be rationed out to army and navy units according to priority.  Work 
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had also increased to provide for increased screening on structures and to improve drainage that 
is acknowledged as increasing sanitary conditions at Segi during September.   
 The conditions continued their work on men and equipment. Lt.(jg) V. C. Olshefski, one 
of the battalion’s medical officers, was transferred from the battalion to a ship for stateside 
removal.  His removal left the battalion with only one medical officer.  The acting OiC, 
Lieutenant Commander Swanson, requested another medical officer as they were “badly in need 
of another one.”23  During September 429 man days were lost to the 47th due to illness.  Of these 
days 277 were lost at Segi with the remainder being lost from the Munda detachment.  As in the 
proceeding months, malaria was the leading culprit with lost manpower.  However, a larger 
percentage of the lost manpower from malaria was at Munda, showing the improving conditions 
at Segi as screening of camp facilities and drainage projects took place.  In total fourteen men 
were transferred out of the battalion in September for medical reason to be replaced by seven 
men returned from medical as well as four transferees.   In his closing remarks in the monthly 
report, Swanson notes that moral and health of the battalion has “shown a definite improvement” 
during September and this is directly attributed to better living conditions caused by a reduction 
in mud, improvement in sanitation, and improved mess facilities and food quality. He also notes 
that “most of the men in poor health have been evacuated and those remaining are the hardier 
ones who can take it.”24 
 The equipment of the 47th showed as much wear as the men and the climate and work 
was also beginning to show which types of equipment could ‘take it’ as well.  The main failures 
in the toughness category were General Motors Corporation (GMC) Dump trucks, specifically 
models CCKW 352 and 353.   The springs and the frame were breaking “regularly” and only 
eight could be kept operational by obtaining replacement parts from Guadalcanal.  The OiC 
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complains “that supply is now exhausted and unless more are obtained it will be impractical to 
keep trucks operating.”  The remaining equipment was being kept functional by stripping parts 
from some equipment to keep others operational.  Equipment lists also show that the heavy 
Caterpillar bulldozers broke down less often than the International heavy tractors.25 
At the end of September, the Segi fighter strip stood at 96% completion with less than 10% of 
work remaining on taxiway “B”, shoulders and drainage for the airfield.  Camp general 
construction was 97% complete and the hospital was 98% complete.  The remaining major 
construction projects under way were road surfacing and gasoline and material dispersal areas.  
Projected projects were now down to an ammunition dump, Dock 2 and the Construction of a 
Battalion Office Building. 
Construction - Segi Point - October 1943 
 Work during the month of October continued on a 24-hour basis and the airfield and 
basic road system were completed as scheduled on 15 October 1943.  This consisted of a 200-
foot wide 3,500-foot long coral surfaced fighter strip with 65 hardstands.  The completion of 
surfacing of all weather roads, including the final 6,500 feet of roadway, brought the total 
surfaced road length at Segi to 17,400 feet by the end of October.  Upon completion of the 
original Segi plan the 47th began working on ‘improvements’ including a small taxiway inside 
taxiway “A” with 10 additional hardstands and widening and improving the strip and dispersal 
areas as time and material permitted.  On 18 October 1943 all of the useable coral at Segi Point 
was exhausted and coral was now obtained from an island 1,000 feet south of the point.  This 
coral was loaded into trucks and the truck ferried back to Segi on a pontoon barge.26 
 The battalion finished construction on a Pontoon Dock, Dock 2, and a 90 foot log ramp 
dock for small craft, Dock 3.  The sawmill produced 139,139 board feet of lumber during 
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October 1943, approximately 4,500 board feet day.  Demand for lumber started declining in 
October and more lumber was diverted to decking in enlisted men’s tents.  The addition of the 
flooring to enlisted quarters and improved drainage along with the addition of more screened 
structures for operational structure and offices improved the mosquito situation at Segi.  
Although the overall sanitation situation improved at Segi again in October, the attrition due to 
the pace of work and climate continued.   
 During October, forty-four men were transferred out from the 47th for medical reasons 
with 28 men from Segi and 16 from Munda.  Only eight men returned to the battalion from 
medical detachment.  The 47th lost 626 man-days labor during October with 325 man days lost at 
Segi and 301 man days lost at Munda.  The Munda numbers are significant showing that 
approximately half of the lost man hours came from the 20% stationed at Munda and the 
majority of those hours, 191, were for malaria compared to 65 days lost to malaria at Segi in 
October.  During October, this places the 47th at roughly 85% of its manpower capacity based on 
what was available in June 1943.  The number also shows the improving sanitary conditions at 
Segi as opposed to the ongoing construction at Munda.  Also, bombing raids at Segi during 
September and October were few with minimal damage or casualties, while Munda saw repeated 
raids.  
 The OiC of the 47th admitted in the October report that the health and moral of the men is 
only fair and that the climate and work load had aggravated physical ailments increasing the 
number of evacuations.  He attributed the pace of work and lack of recreation and diversion as 
major contributing factors saying “that the continual hard work appears to be making the men 
become more indifferent to their work and responsibilities, in spite of the fact that their living 
and mess conditions have been continually improved.”   A look at the list of diseases reported for 
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lost work days in October shows malaria falling but many other illness, especially those related 
to fatigue and exposure, increasing.27 
The spare parts situation was again brought up as a primary reason for equipment time 
lost along with the faulty springs and frames on the GMC trucks assigned to the unit.  Lt. 
Commander Swanson was very direct in his assessment of the parts situation, stating: 
“Numerous requests for parts and material have been made but very few of them 
have been filled.  Some few parts and material have been obtained by sending 
men to nearby rear bases for them. In general this Battalion has had very little 
success in obtaining needed parts and materials while at this base.”28 
 
This parts situation as described by Swanson is the endemic complaint of all the NCB 
Commanders at New Georgia.  A response to the 47th from the Bureau of Yards and Docks 
addresses this issue advising that “spare parts have been and are being shipped to the spare parts 
depots located at EPIC (Noumea, New Caledonia) and EBON (Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides), in 
large quantities.”  The majority of blame for the inadequacy of parts delivers is placed on a “lack 
of inter-island shipping.”  There were sixteen pieces of equipment of the 47th NCB down for lack 
of parts or in need of repairs ranging from those that could be repaired to those awaiting parts 
and three listed as beyond repair.29 
With major airfield activities at Segi complete, the 47th began a series of secondary 
projects.  The projects that were underway by the start of November were the North and South 
Shoulders of the Airstrip that were almost completed and work around the Tank Farm and Gas 
Disposal Area.  Their newest projects were the refrigerator installations and the Swimming Pool.   
The swimming pool was completed in early November and was 150 long by 75 feet wide and 
was considered a great improvement to base morale.  Work was stopped on the addition of extra 
hardstands inside Taxi loop “A” upon notification that aircraft based at Segi were to be reduced. 
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Construction - Segi Point – November 1943 through January 1943 
During November, much of the work done by the 47th at Segi consisted of improvements 
to camp facilities and to provided maintenance for the base and air operations.  While recreation 
time and opportunity increased greatly for the 47th at Segi with the nightly movies, two softball 
leagues and a scheduled boxing tournament, the toll of the work and the climate again shows up 
on the roster of men and equipment.  There were 274 man-days lost during November between 
the contingent at Segi and the smaller group at Munda.  Of these days seventy-two were lost to 
malaria with sixty-two of those at Munda.  While malaria seems to have been the plague of 
Munda, there were forty-one days lost to operational and combat fatigue at Segi.  The monthly 
report again lists the health and moral of the men as fair with the tropical climate having 
“aggravated the physical ailments and weakness of the men,” resulting in the large number of 
medical evacuations.  The manpower roster shows only 882 men for the month of November, 
down from the 1,052 enlisted manpower complement that originally went overseas.30 
Equipment status during November was improved from October with only five pieces of 
equipment non-operational due to breakage or lack of parts.  This is accountable for equipment 
down time for repairs with the majority of work completed at Segi.  However, the majority of the 
equipment listed for the 47th was graded as only being in “fair” operating condition at best, with 
only twenty-eight of the battalions approximately 164 pieces of equipment listed as “good” and 
the majority of this equipment consisted of new jeeps and trucks with new springs installed.   
The 47th NCB was placed under the 15th Naval Construction Regiment in November 
1943 and it received a new commanding officer, Commander Robert W. Van Stan, on 9 
December 1943.  Commander Van Stan oversaw the move of the 47th NCB from Segi to Munda 
during the month of December 1943.  By the end of December, only 150 men were based at Segi 
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for maintenance and the operation of the sawmill, of which almost all produced lumber was 
being shipped to Munda.  Operation of the sawmill was deemed difficult due the distance 
suitable lumber had to be hauled to the mill operation.  The last of the 47th NCB's personnel were 
detached to Munda on 15 January 1944 with maintenance activities for the Segi Air Strip turned 
over to Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 580 during the month of December. 
Segi Point Airfield - Conclusion 
Table 2 is the list of all projects completed by the 47th NCB at Segi during their tenure at 
the base.  These projects represent the complete base at Segi as of December 1943 when the 
maintenance was turned over to the CBMU.  There were 17,800 feet of all weather roads 
connecting the facilities at the strip to the camp, the harbor, and to Munda, with and an additional 
3,500 feet of all weather access roads around the airfield.  When this figure is taken into 
consideration with the depth of compacted fill on roadways being between three and nine feet, 
there is a minimum of 59,200 cubic yards of compacted coral with potentially as much as 
118,300 cubic yards of coral in the road system alone using an average of six feet of compacted 
depth.  These figures are based on the length of roads times the reported depth and a minimum 
road width of twenty feet.  The airfield at Segi as completed was 3,500 feet long by 200 feet 
wide with 75-foot wide shoulders.  With an assumed one-foot depth of compacted coral 
surfacing, this is approximately 45,000 cubic yards of compacted coral in the strip surfacing. 
With the taxiways and sixty hardstands assumed at one hundred feet in width with a length of 
3,500 feet each there is an additional 28,000 cubic yards of compacted material in taxiways and 
hardstands assuming one foot of compacted material.  There exists at Segi the potential for the 
47th NCB to have excavated and placed as much as 135,000 cubic yards of coral surfacing 
material between 30 June 1943 and 1 November 1943.31 
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Table 2 – Projects Completed by the 47th NCB at Segi 
Construction of Sawmill Control Tower 
Homing Tower Ready Building 
Enlisted Men’s Galley Communications Building 
Port Director’s Office Operations Building & Dugout
Radar Installation on Vangunu Island Post Office 
SCAT Operations Building 90mm on Vangunu Island 
Telephone Exchange Gasoline Tank and Pipeline
Officer’s Showers Enlisted Men’s Showers 
AvGas Filling Station Communications Dugout No. 1
First Aid Station Harbor Control Tower 
Conduits Under Strip Officer’s Mess 
Officer’s Quarters Dental Office 
Communications Dugout No. 2 Ship’s Service Building 
Addition to Enlisted Men’s Galley Construction Battalion Dispensary
Mine and Bomb Disposal Building Dock No. 1 
Dock No. 4 CPO Mess 
Bomb Fuse Magazine Automobile Filling Station 
Equipment Repair Shop Electric System 
Water System Marine Railway 
Boat Watering Point “A” Taxiway and Hardstands
“D” Taxiway and Hardstands Clearing West Strip Approach
Dock No. 2 NCB Office Building 
NCB Ship’s Service Building Library 
Mosquito Control Building Gas Disposal Area No. 1 
Gas Disposal Area No. 2 Gas Disposal Area No. 3 
North Shoulder of Strip South Shoulder of Strip 
Fire Wall around Tank Farm Taxiway and Hardstands inside “A” loop 
Gas Disposal Area No. 4 Refrigerator Installations 
Swimming Pool 8 Foxholes near strip 
Dock No. 3 Painter Road 
Munda Road CASU Engineering Facilities
 
 The Segi sawmill produced on average between 4,500 and 6,000 feet per day during 
operation from July until the 47th departed.  With supply of lumber being used at Segi until 
November, the battalion produced over 725,000 board feet of lumber assuming an average of 
5,000 board feet per day with 145 days of operation.  This lumber went into the numerous 
building projects at Segi, including at least sixteen buildings not counting individual officer’s 
and enlisted personnel quarters.  In addition to the dock and marine railway and supply, the 47th 
also performed repair and salvage of aircraft and boats, unloaded ships, and repaired equipment.  
The 47th also ran the Segi Naval Base power and water supply network for approximately 1,700 
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naval personnel, as well as providing these services for some1,800 US Army troops and 
personnel.32 
 All of this work was conducted in incredibly hot and humid conditions that resulted in the 
evacuation of 114 men reported and the loss of an average of 422 man days per month due to 
disease, fatigue and injury.  This is an average of fourteen men on sick roster, an estimated 1% 
manpower loss every day that remains consistent throughout the deployment at the different 
locations.   By September the unit was down to 880 men due to the individuals transferred out 
with serious medical conditions.  Accounting for the 20% of the battalion at Munda, the majority 
of the work at Segi after August was done by around 700 men, which was roughly 2/3 of a full 
battalion’s strength, with only ¾ of their heavy bulldozers operational.  Looking at the medical 
information by January when the 47th NCB reported to Munda from Segi, it was effectively at 
76% of manpower capacity with 804 men on the active roster and on any given day was only 
capable of having 75% of its manpower capacity operational due to sick roster.  This along with 
the fact that 80% of its equipment was listed only as fair after 5 months of heavy use and 2 
months of refitting shows the effects of the climate and pace of work. 
 39
CHAPTER 3 
 
MUNDA 
 
The Munda Point Airfield and Naval Base 
Rendova Landings 30 June – July 1943 
The assault on the main objective of the New Georgia campaign, the Japanese airfield at 
Munda Point, began with the Rendova landings of the Eastern Landing force on 30 June 1943 as 
per the TOENAILS plan.  The landings were set for Rendova Island and then for a shore-to-
shore movement to New Georgia under air support from Guadalcanal and artillery support from 
Rendova.  The 24th NCB was to be the first Seabee Battalion to perform an amphibious combat 
landing in conjunction with units of the 43rd Division United States Army on D-day.  The 24th 
NCB had been in preparation for the landing since the end of May and the 1st Echelon of the 24th 
participated in a series of amphibious landing drills with Army combat teams during the last two 
weeks in June in the Russell Islands.  The 24th NCBs landing at Rendova and the events that 
followed were momentous. 
The 1st Echelon of the 24th NCB, consisting of consisting of approximately 500 men and 
officers, landed on Rendova Beach under Japanese fire with the 172nd Infantry Combat Team of 
the 43rd Division USA.  These units immediately set out to build roads and prepare for unloading 
of supplies and equipment.  The conditions during the first 12 days of the operation were 
incredibly difficult with equipment bogging down in the mud caused by poor soil conditions and 
heavy rainfall.  The 1st Echelon was only allowed to bring six small HD-7 Allis-Chalmers 
bulldozers for the initial landing and these proved exceedingly unsatisfactory.  The commanding 
officer in his report of activities stated that “this should never be permitted in the future” and that 
only “HD-10 tractors or larger [are] the only types that could be effectively used.”1  The 
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frustration with the smaller size tractors continued with further request that tractors sent to 
combat conditions be equipped with winches to improve versatility and usefulness in muddy 
conditions.  In order to move Marine and Army equipment from the beaches, the 24th built 
“corduroy” roads out of coconut logs after metal “Summerfield” mesh proved useless in making 
roads.  The metal mesh materials such as Summerfield and Marston Matting proved useless in 
areas such as Rendova where the soil “was marshy, with no firm substrata” and were unable to 
provide a stable base.  The commander of the 24th NCB noted that “had the soil conditions 
previously been known,” then “a solution could have been previously prepared.”  His suggestion 
was strips of railroad ties or heavy timbers cabled together in rolls and brought with the land 
force to roll out as temporary roadways.2 
The second day after the landings, 2 July 1943, saw the 24th NCB suffer massive 
casualties for a CB unit.  During a bombing raid at 1330 hours several bombs struck the unit and 
detonated one of their fuel stores and set off five tons of dynamite.  The 24th suffered casualties 
of two officers and eighteen enlisted men killed, eight men missing, and numerous men wounded 
who had to be evacuated to Guadalcanal.  The explosions also destroyed three of the battalion’s 
bulldozers, their galley equipment, and most of the men’s sea bags and personal belongings.  The 
men of the 1st Echelon of the 24th lived in very muddy condition for the majority of the month of 
July, and with the loss of equipment, their living conditions were extremely difficult by Seabee 
standards. The commander stated that during the first six days of the invasion the men lived in 
eight inches to one foot of mud and water.  A second major bombing raid occurred on 4 July 
1943 at 1400 hours but it did little damage to the beach facilities and caused only one Seabee 
casualty. Most of the Japanese bombers were shot down.  
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  In his report of activities of the first six days and the follow up report of the next four 
days after D-Day, Commander Whittaker explained in detail some of the concerns and problems 
facing the Seabees at Rendova and at Munda in general.  He recommended that “men over forty 
not be sent on such expeditions,” not because they are unwilling to serve, but because “they 
cannot stand it, mentally and physically.”3 There were constant air raids, nights with no sleep, 
and what little sleep there was had to be taken in open foxholes with six inches to one foot of 
water and or mud with no mosquito netting.  Adding to the exhaustion factor, they only received 
two meals per day and were wearing out.  The commander also recommended a more serious 
screening for “possible psychopathic cases.”  There were ten such cases, described as war 
hysteria, evacuated from the 24th during the first ten days. By the tenth day after landing, 9 July 
1943, the 24th had lost twenty-one men in combat, ten more to war hysteria, and thirty-three men 
were in sick bay. 4  This represents 14% of the manpower of the first echelon lost combined with 
over 20% of their available heavy equipment out of action. The final tally from the Rendova 
landings was reported as twenty-eight dead and twenty-one wounded.5 
 In a personal letter written to the “Chief,” Commander Whittaker explained that the most 
dangerous job run by the 24th NCB was the unloading on the beach.  Men unloaded munitions 
and gasoline from LSTs on the open beach and were vulnerable to bombing and strafing runs by 
enemy aircraft.  The tension and stress he noted was extremely high, yet even with this level of 
stress and tension, Whittaker was proud that his men performed all the tasks that were asked of 
them and notes that even with the discomforts “the spirits are high.” He again expressed how 
“our men over 35 years of age and above were completely unprepared for the shock and trial of 
being under constant red alerts and Japanese air raid” while sleeping on the ground in the mud 
and water.  With most of their mosquito netting destroyed, Whittaker stated “it is only a matter 
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of time before many of my men will be down with malaria.”  He was very correct in his 
assesment.6 
 The 2nd Echelon of the 24th NCB of approximately 450 men joined the 1st Echelon on 18 
July 1943 arriving at Kokurana and Baribuna Islands off of Rendova.  The majority of the work 
of the 24th NCB was the building of LST and Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) landings at Rendova, 
Rovianna, Bau Island, and at Sassavele.  The 24th also built a Powered Torpedo (PT) Boat Base, 
boat landing facilities, and roads used to bring supplies to the front.  Munda field was taken from 
the Japanese on 5 August 1943 after over a month of fighting.  The 24th NCB was ordered to 
Munda on 7 August 1943 and began the move from Rendova to Munda in small boats.  The 
move to Munda by the 24th NCB was not completed until 15 August 1943 
Munda Field - Japanese 
The field that was captured from the Japanese was surfaced with coral and was 
approximately 150 feet wide by 3,000 feet long.  This field had been bombed and shelled by 
naval task groups continuously since its discovery in December 1942 and bombed and shelled 
extensively during the battle for Munda during July and early August.  The Japanese had built 
Munda under improvised camouflage netting.  It is a widely known legend that the Japanese 
cabled the tops of the coconut and palm trees together and removed the trunks and stumps to 
build the airfield underneath a suspended layer of palm tops.  No evidence of this was found to 
support this myth and it was not remarked upon by any Seabee unit stationed at Munda including 
the 24th and 73rd NCB, which arrived within a day of the capture of the field.  Its feasibility is 
extremely unlikely from a practical and engineering standpoint.  The construction method used 
by the Japanese at Munda was to build their airfield and taxiways around the tree trunks leaving 
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them in place as camouflage until the field was near completion and then they removed the trees 
and filled the resulting holes. 
Japanese documents and historical information confirm the method of construction the 
Japanese used at Munda.   The 10th Construction Unit of the Imperial Japanese Army built the 
airfield at Munda Point with the assistance of Japanese Army and Naval Units, including 
sections of the 22nd and 4th Imperial Japanese Naval Construction Units, stationed at Munda 
starting in November 1942.   The official Japanese military history notes that the location chosen 
at the Methodist Kokengolo Plantation was “covered with palm trees and Japan did not try to fell 
down trees because Japan did not want enemies to notice” the air field construction.7  The typical 
composition of an army construction unit such as the one assigned to Munda was approximately 
“900 shovels, about 90 hoes, some rollers for surface compaction, and 100 members” and was 
staffed and equipped on the basis of “using natives and working flat places.”8  
The Japanese Army had realized the importance of using heavier equipment and “the 
army selected classified weapons (tanks) for breaking through jungles for cutting down trees” 
and they also used “construction machinery of Japanese companies” but these were “primitive 
machines.”9  There is no evidence that the Japanese construction units at Munda used any 
equipment heavier than trucks and rollers, some of which were captured and put to use by the 
Seabees at Munda.  However, at Rabaul, the Japanese discovered the “tank was not so much 
useful although it was useful for pushing down trees.” Most of the construction of airfields as 
performed by the Japanese Army was done by human labor and “mostly used shovels and 
saws.”10  
The Japanese Navy had similar units to the army and these were referred to as Setsusei 
Tai or Pioneer Units.  The Japanese Navy recognized that one of their disadvantages was the lack 
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of the ability to set up forward bases with the same speed of the United States.  The Japanese 
Navy was very well aware that their method that “used shovel and scoop by humans” could not 
compete with the US Navy method that “used bulldozer and power shovel.”11  Similar to the 
United States the Japanese Navy had incorporated its civilian construction into a military arm in 
August 1941 and this included the incorporation of civilian technicians into the military, 
although this organizational change did not reach the field level until after the New Georgia 
Campaign.12  This is confirmed by US interrogation reports of Japanese Prisoners of War capture 
during the Battle for Munda.  
Several members of the 17th Setsusei Tai, also referred to as a Mitsuda Butai or Naval 
Construction Unit, were captured between Rendova and Munda and their information provides a 
look at these Construction Units as they were present at Munda.  The estimated strength of the 
17th Setsusei Tai was around 500 men, most of whom were civilian military employees with one 
Naval Lieutenant and approximately 15 Naval Petty Officers, according to one interrogation 
report and up to 2,000 civilian laborer and 300 Naval Guard by another.  The report of 500 is 
from a captured civilian carpenter and the figure of 2,000 civilian laborers was from a Petty 
Officer 2nd Class.  The equipment from all sources places the 17th Setsusei Tai as having at least 
five trucks and one “steam roller” and a large supply of hand tools ranging from shovels and 
picks to carpentry tools.  Information from the interrogation reports shows that the unit was 
divided into seven sections with five primarily airfield construction laborers with one section of 
carpenters and one section of masons.  Other reports also include an electrical section 
responsible for laying telephone wires and a transportation section.13 
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The Plan for Munda 
The original plan for the allied aviation facilities at Munda was proposed in the Master 
Plan for Munda Air Field dated June 27, 1943.  The first objective was to repair immediately the 
captured field for the operation of approximately twenty fighter air craft to support continuing 
combat operations on New Georgia and the immediate vicinity.  The runway was then to be 
repaired to operate scout aircraft and expanded for operation for sixty fighter and scout aircraft 
as soon as possible.  The plan required Munda to be enlarged to support bomber operations and 
authorized Acorn 8, to which the 73rd NCB was attached, to survey Munda for expansion and to 
survey and submit proposals for the operation of support bases and additional airfields.  
The master plan laid out a schedule requiring the field to be operational at a minimum of 
2,100 feet by 100 feet wide within four days of capture.  Priorities within ten days of occupation 
were set as the completion of gasoline dumps, ammunition dumps, operations and 
communications dugouts, and a camp for one Acorn and one-half CASU.  The repair and 
operation for the existing 4,000 feet with operational taxiways and runways was set for twenty 
days after occupation to accommodate sixty fighter aircraft operations.  Specifications for the 
requirements of fighter and bomber strips for the Munda area were specified with a minimum 
length of 4,000 feet by 100 feet wide for fighter strips and 5,000 feet by 150 feet for medium 
bombers and 6,000 feet by 150 feet for heavy bombers.  The surfacing requirement for fighter 
strips was set at a minimum of eight inches of compacted coral for fighter strips with twelve-inch 
and eighteen-inch minimum surfaces for medium and heavy bombers respectively. 
The runways were to be graded with 1.5% slopes from the crown and were to be a 
minimum of 150 feet wide for both bomber and fighter operations.  Taxiways were to be a 
minimum of forty feet for fighter operations and sixty feet for bomber operations.  Runways 
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were not to exceed a 1.0% grade and taxiways a 2.0% grade.  The fields were to be constructed 
by removing “humus material and vegetation” from the area to be graded for airfields and the 
underlying coral was to be worked with rooter and roller “into a smooth compacted surface.”  
Once the overburden was removed and the subsurface, or subgrade, was prepared, the surfacing 
layers of coral were to be placed in approximate eight inch lifts, or layer of crushed coral, and 
each lift was to be individually compacted.14 
 On 11 July 1943, COMAIRSOPAC, issued an addendum, serial 0559, to the Master Plan 
for Munda.  This letter clarified the desire of Vice Admiral Fitch to get the Munda field 
reconditioned as soon as possible.  It also clarified that Acorn 8 was to survey the vicinity of 
Munda and find a location for two additional fighter support airfields, preferably a location for a 
double fighter strip, in the anticipation that Munda Field would be configured for bomber 
operations.  This letter also authorized existing construction troops with the occupation force, the 
24th NCB, to start work on the captured Munda Airfield prior to the arrival of Acorn 8 and it 
stipulated that Acorn 8 should be augmented with construction personnel to “insure simultaneous 
work on three runways.”15 
The Master Plan for Munda Area was revised on 12 July 1943 in reference to the 
COMAIRSOPAC serial 0559 of 11 July 1943.  The construction deadline for the first revision 
was set for 25 September 1943.  The captured Munda field was to be made capable of servicing, 
fueling and arming 20 fighter aircraft per hour with capacity of basing 100 fighter aircraft for 
operation by 25 September.   Initial priorities for the first ten days post occupation were set for 
“passable roads” connecting the airfield to camp areas, beach heads, supply area, and fuel and 
ammunition dumps.  The runway was to be operational at 3,500 feet within seven days of 
occupation and widened to 150 feet by fifteen days post occupation.  The field was to be 
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operational at 4,000 feet within thirty days and was to be ultimately extended to 6,000 feet to 
support the operation of a minimum of forty-eight heavy bombers.  Aircraft capacity at Munda 
was to be at twenty fighters within ten days, forty by fifteen days, and sixty by twenty days with 
the full 100 fighter aircraft capacity by 25 September 1943.  This revision planned for a 
minimum of forty-eight heavy bombers as the planned objective and revised the specifications 
for size of fuel and ammunition dumps.  Requirements for bolting capacity were set at 96,000 
rounds per day for .50 caliber ammunition by 25 September and bomb dispersal connected by all 
weather roads was set for 7,500 bombs by 25 October 1943.  Fueling requirements were set for 
an aviation gas tank farm of twelve 1,000-barrel tanks with a tanker filling connection by 25 
September and ultimately a 25,000 barrel tank farm to support bomber operations. 
Two fighter airfields were specified, referred to as Munda Fields No. 2 and No. 3, to be 
built in the vicinity of Munda.  These fields were to be capable of rearming, refueling, and 
servicing twenty fighter aircraft per hour and were to have the capacity of 100 fighter aircraft 
each by 25 September 1943.  The runways were to be completed to 3,500 feet by 100 feet wide 
by 25 August 1943 and they were to be 4,000 feet by 150 feet by 25 September 1943.  
Operationally these two fields were to be built as the fields at Segi Plantation.  It is noted for 
both the captured field at Munda Point and the proposed fields No. 2 and No. 3 that the 
development of these fields “into heavy bomber fields should be kept in mind at all times.”16 
Construction at Munda – August 1943 
The 24th NCB was ordered to Munda on 7 August and made their transition from 
Rendova to Munda in stages, completing their move on 15 August.  Their assigned priority was 
the rehabilitation of the captured Japanese Airfield.  From 7 August until 13 August the 24th 
NCB used all their “road equipment for reconditioning the air strip” after which time they were 
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relieved by newly arrived 73rd NCB and Acorn 8.  Once relieved of airfield duty by the 73rd 
NCB, the 24th NCB was assigned to road and camp construction and the improvement of 
landings at Lambeti Landing and the design and construction of Olsen’s landing.  The 24th NCB 
expended approximately 3,204 man-hours on the preparation of Munda field.  The remainder of 
their expended man-hours were spent on road construction, landing facilities, and the 
construction at the landings.  The 24th had twenty-one men transferred out of the battalion with 
thirty-four returning to duty with 207 sick days lost and one man killed in action.  With these 
losses, the 24th NCB was functionally at 75% of its manpower capacity with many men on light 
duty.  The picture for their equipment was worse.  Commander Whittaker reported that the 24th 
NCB was “seriously handicapped by lack of equipment” and that “numerous requests have been 
made to have the Battalion completely re-equipped.”   The Commander estimated that the 24th 
was operating with less than 40% of its equipment and that number would fall week to week 
“due to complete lack of repair parts.”  In his final assessment Whittaker said that the 24th NCB 
could not produce more than “50% of our capacity” without new equipment.17 
The 73rd NCB, as part of Acorn 8, under Commander K.P Doane began arriving at 
Munda soon after the capture.  A survey team of two platoons arrived on 6 August with another 
group and 60% of the battalion’s equipment arriving on 9 August with the final contingent of the 
73rd arriving on 11 August 1943.  The 73rd took over construction of the airfield on 11 August 
and “all equipment available in the Munda area was obtained from the 24th NCB and the various 
army and marine units for use until the field was open for flying.”  The Japanese air strip was 
refurbished and ready for operation by 13 August with hardstands available for fifty aircraft by 
the morning of 14 August.18 
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Operations were conducted around the clock without lights due to good weather and a 
“nearly full moon.”  Commander Doane described the conditions of the Munda field area, stating 
that “the coral is in general useable” and there averaged approximately one foot of soil cover 
over the coral that required removal.  The coral was described as being able to be loosened by D-
7 and D-8 bulldozers with only some need for blasting and this material could be moved and 
loaded with ¾ yard shovels.  He notes that units with equipment smaller than D-7s and D-8s and 
with shovels of less than ¾ yards were having to do more blasting because the smaller equipment 
was not capable of loosening the coral for hauling.  The battalion was happy with the 
performance of their 8 yard pans but recommended 12 yard pans to expedite the work, noting 
that the “8 yard pans… are small.”  The other equipment complaint was that flat rollers were 
“not entirely satisfactory” and that ten-ton rollers were being obtained from army units and they 
performed more satisfactorily than the seven-ton units with which the 73rd was supplied.19 
Road construction in August was transferred to the 24th NCB and three army engineering 
units.  The commander of the 73rd noted that the 24th NCBs equipment was light and was “worn 
out before it was moved to Munda.”  Due to this fact, the progress was slow on completion of 
roads.  There is also commentary that there was a lack of screening material for galley and 
hospitals.  He also notes that screen designated for the 73rd camp and galley was redirected by 
orders of the Acorn Commander to screen “the pilots’ camp and the camp for the staff of 
COMAIR, New Georgia.”  He recommended that future Acorns have such material set aside for 
the facilities of the Air Commander.20 
Finishing out the month, a detachment of four officers and 201 men for the 47th NCB 
with four bulldozers, six carry alls, six dump trucks, and one roller were transferred to Munda 
from Segi.21  It was also noted that the channel through the Munda Bar was hazardous for LSTs 
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and therefore it became necessary to trans-ship all material from LSTs to LCTs at Sasevell 
Island.  Blasting operations were started on the Munda Bar on 15 August to deepen the channel 
to allow LSTs to cross the bar.  Drilling equipment would be required to deepen the channel to 
thirty-five feet.  Also on 16 August, the 73rd was shelled causing the death of two personnel.  The 
first killed was Pharmacy Mate 1st Class T.C. Williams for whom the 73rd NCB’s camp, Camp 
Williams, was named. 
Construction at Munda – September 1943 
During September the 73rd NCB continued construction operations at Munda as the 
primary unit.  In addition to the 24th NCB a detachment of the 47th NCB the US Army’s 828th 
Aviation Engineers were assigned to Munda to assist the 73rd NCB with the completion of the 
field which was scheduled for 15 October for bomber operations.  The commander of the 73rd 
noted that the equipment of the 828th consisted of “eight D-7 Bulldozers, four D-4 Bulldozers, 
six road patrols, two 3/8 yard shovels, two road rollers, and twenty-five dump trucks, all of 
which have been badly worn with nine months of service in the South Pacific.” The battle to 
keep this equipment and that borrowed from the 47th and the 828th operational was a constant 
struggle with Doane stating that the 73rd had been able to keep 75% of the equipment of these 
two units running.22 
The situation with equipment continues to show the problem of spare parts with “the 
supply of spare running very low” and many parts were having to be manufactured by the base 
machine shop.  Several pieces of equipment were also recognized as being “too light.”  The 8-
yard pans and the ¾ yard shovels were “both proven light for the work done here.”  A new 1-1/2 
yard shovel delivered to the 24th NCB was used in the coral pit and “its added weight and 
crowding power makes it a much more practicable machine for digging coral…”  More 
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equipment was arriving at Munda with the completion of the fifteen foot deep channel through 
Munda bar in September.  The plan to deepen the channel to thirty-five feet was on hold pending 
the arrival of a drilling barge and a dredge.23 
Enemy action was a big concern during September.  On 28 September the camp area of 
the 73rd was hit during a night time bombing raid.  It was noted “that the bombs fell at the same 
time the ‘condition red’ signal was given.”  The death of SF2c James W. Sparks, for whom the 
Seabees named the pilot’s camp, was considered avoidable “if the air raid warning system had 
been functioning properly.”  The 73rd took to placing men to listen for enemy planes during 
hours of darkness “in order to have some degree of protection” because the air raid warning 
system was inadequate.  Night time operation of equipment was curtailed after 12 September to 
prevent damage to personnel and equipment because of the lack of appropriate air raid 
warnings.24 
The 24th NCB continued building roads and this situation improved with drier weather 
and took over construction of the aviation gas tank farm from the 73rd, but their equipment and 
manpower situation was dire.  The 24th NCB reported 1,328 sick days, of which 459 were 
malaria, with twenty-nine men evacuated during the month of September and the Commander 
Whittaker continued to press for new equipment because ten of his bulldozers were out of 
commission for lack of parts or destroyed by bombing.25  The detachment of the 47th NCB at 
Munda was assigned to extending and widening Taxiway “A” to 3,400 feet long by 300 feet 
wide.  The 828th was assigned the task of extending the runway at Munda 2,000 feet with a 500 
foot overrun.26   
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Construction at Munda – October 1943 
The Munda Airfield was ready for medium bomber operations prior to the deadline set 
for the 73rd of 15 October 1943.  To achieve this, as well as bringing Taxi loops “F” and “E” 
online prior to their respective November deadline, the 73rd NCB obtained the “assistance of the 
131st Army Engineers.”  Their equipment was “very light” and “insufficient” to the task but was 
put to use to meet the deadline for bomber operations.  During the month of October the 73rd and 
associated units worked a daily schedule of 0600 hours to 2400 hours.27 
The 73rd NCB also began to operate a sawmill to provide lumber for the operation for 
construction activities at Munda. The sawmill was described as “undersized” and “under 
powered” with 48 inch and 52 inch blades and the commander of the 73rd recommended that 
only sawmill units with 72 inch blades be sent to areas with trees as large as those located at 
Munda.  The sawmill produced an average of 5,000 board feet per day starting in October. 
Comment is made in the 73rd monthly report describing the size of the trees and the difficulty of 
moving trees of this size, some greater than six feet in diameter, to the sawmill.  This activity 
required the detailing of a Caterpillar D-7 bulldozer to haul logs to the sawmill operation.  The 
commander of the 73rd recommended that in addition to larger sawmilling equipment each NCB 
should be equipped with “one or more tractors of about 60 horse power” for moving logs to the 
sawmill operation and he recommended the use of “Athey” trailers, which the 73rd borrowed 
from Naval Base Munda Ordnance Department and remodeled for moving logs.28 
The equipment situation was still very aggravating to all the NCBs at Munda during 
October.  The major concerns were spare parts and lack of appropriate gear oil and gasoline.  In 
his monthly report Doane reports that “some spare parts have been obtained from the Advanced 
Base Construction Depot at BEVY (Guadalcanal)”.  However, he stipulated that it was 
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“necessary to send an officer… to expedite their delivery.”  He expressed his opinion that “it 
would not seem necessary to send and officer on such a mission, but to date spare parts have 
been obtained only when an officer has gone to the warehouse to expedite them.”  The Status of 
Heavy Equipment for the 73rd NCB for October shows that of the 147 pieces of heavy equipment 
assigned to the battalion only 137 were working in ‘good condition’, three were working in ‘poor 
condition’, one was under repair with available parts, three were awaiting spare parts delivery, 
and three were damaged beyond repair.29 
Commander Whittaker of the 24th NCB expressed similar complaints in October.  His 
situation was somewhat improved with the arrival of “sufficient Heavy Equipment and rolling 
stock” to replace the equipment lost during the Rendova landings and during the first week at 
Munda.  Yet he continued to comment that he had “eleven tractors awaiting the delivery of new 
steering clutch discs which have been ordered and requested by so many letters and also 
dispatches from both the Commanding Officer of the Battalion and the Commanding Officer, 
Naval Bases, New Georgia.”  Of the twenty-six tractors available to the 24th NCB, four were 
destroyed beyond repair and being cannibalized of parts, six of the eleven tractors in need of 
clutch discs were not operational until those parts could be obtained, and the others were 
operating in ‘poor’ condition.  This still left the 24th at a deficit of approximately 60% of its 
heavy equipment capacity.  Of the ‘new’ pieces of equipment received by the 24th NCB in 
October two were Northwest Shovels-Cranes with a 2 cubic yard capacity.  One of these was 
received having “been run before being received without the use of crater compound” resulting 
in the bearing plates being worn down, and the other had one rehaul drum frozen resulting in 
“considerable trouble during operation.”  No spare parts were available to repair these units.30 
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The trouble with gear oil was affecting all NCB battalions and the Army Engineer units 
at Munda operating Caterpillar’s equipment.  The proper manufacturer’s recommended gear oil 
of “140 SAE or heavier” for the operation of the heavy equipment in tropical climate was not 
being supplied.  The 73rd monthly report indicates that the Army Services Command, responsible 
for supplying this material to Munda, had “stated that 90 SAE, all purpose oil, is sufficient, and 
they recommend that no heavier oil be brought into this territory.”  Commander Doane remarked 
that all the units would “continue to have trouble with this equipment unless heavier oil than 90 
SAE is made available.”  The battalions at Munda were also facing a shortage of “80 octane 
gasoline, cable, oxygen and nails.”  The gasoline situation was requiring the units to mix 100 
octane aviation gasoline with diesel oil or kerosene to run heavy equipment which was causing 
“considerable valve trouble.”31 
Construction activities during the month of October, in addition to the expansion of the 
Taxiways “F” and “E” by the 73rd NCB, was the completion of extension and widening of 
Taxiway “A” by the detachment of the 47th NCB at Munda who then assisted the 73rd on work 
on Taxiway “F” and other fuel facility and ordnance related projects. The 73rd also continued 
work on Camp Williams, the 73rd NCB camp, Camp Sparks, the enlisted aviation crew camp, 
and ‘Maudie’s Mansion’, the aviation officers’ camp. The 24th NCB continued to primarily work 
on roadway construction and landing facilities with additional work on camps and the CUB 3 
hospital.   
The 73rd NCB monthlies do not contain medical reports, Attachment C, but the 24th and 
47th monthly’s for October show that the 47th lost 301 sick days for its contingent of 184 men at 
Munda with the majority being lost to malaria.  This represents approximately 5% loss of 
manpower due to sickness at Munda for October.  The 24th NCB reported 2,076 man days lost 
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with 522 days lost to Malaria with the next highest lost to skin ulcers.  This represents almost 
10% of the 24th effective manpower of which over 2% was malaria.  Commander Doane does 
note that there “is a small percentage or malaria, which is believed to be a holdover from 
Guadalcanal.”32  It is interesting to note that in December Major General Maxwell Murray 
commented on a medical officer’s report indicating that sanitary conditions at Camp Sparks, 73rd 
NCB, the 24th NCB camp and Naval Base Munda all rated “poor”.  His comment is that “young 
commanders have little conception of their responsibility for making the best of their living 
condition.”  This is perhaps unfair in light of the fact that Doane had previously requested more 
mosquito netting because his had been appropriated for the Pilots camp at Maudie’s Mansion.33 
Construction at Munda – November 1943 
During the month of November 1943 all work on the airfield and air housing was 
confirmed as being the responsibility and under the direction of the 73rd NCB.  Therefore, under 
73rd NCB directions were the 828th Aviation Engineers and the Munda Detachment of the 47th 
NCB.  All work on aviation facilities was on or ahead of schedule for November.  The revised 
plans for Munda called for the air field and taxiway “D” to be extended 2,000 feet with final 
airfield length to be 8,000 feet for heavy bomber operations and the addition of Taxiways “H” 
and “J”. The field was extended to 7,000 feet and the first 1,000 of the Taxiway “D” extension 
was completed by the end of November.  In addition to this, “A” Taxiloop was completed by the 
47th NCB.  It was noted that to complete the field to 8,000 feet with appropriate glide angle for 
heavy bombers that approximately 15 feet would have to be removed from a hill at the East end 
of the field.  This would require 150,000 cubic yards of material removal in addition to the work 
already scheduled.  Other projects approved in November for future construction were the 
addition of quonset huts to existing units, the expansion of the Command Air Solomons 
 56
(COMAIRSOLS) Camp, Pilots camp, and enlisted camp and the construction of new camps for 
the 14th and 11th Airdromes and four bomber squadrons with space for 600 officers and 3,000 
men.  The commander of the 73rd requested the services on an additional NCB to complete these 
projects by the projected 1 January 1944 date. 
 The resources available to the combined 73rd NCB operation as of the end of November 
1943 are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3 – Manpower for Munda Aviation Projects – November 1943 
Organization Officers Non Commissioned 
Officers 
Enlisted Men 
73rd NCB 25 79 889 
47th NCB (1 company) 4 14 159 
828th Aviation 
Engineers (US Army) 
31 40 765 
 
Table 4 – Equipment for Munda Aviation Projects – November 1943 
Organization Bulldozers Shovels Trucks 
47th NCB (1 
company) 
2 D-8 with pans 
4 TD-18 with pans 
(2 down awaiting parts) 
0 6 (2-1/2 tons - 
dump) 
828th Aviation 
Engineers (US Army) 
8 D-7 with pans 
4 D-4 
(8 down awaiting parts) 
2 (1/2 cubic yard) 
(1 down awaiting 
parts) 
20 (1-1/2 tons - 
dump) 
73rd NCB  8 D-8 
8 D-7 with pans 
(2 down awaiting parts) 
4 (3/4 cubic yard) 24 (2-1/2 tons - 
dump) 
 
The commander of the 73rd noted that this equipment was not equivalent to the two fully 
equipped NCBs he estimated would be required to finish the assigned construction tasks by the 
deadline.  He also noted that the equipment of the 47th and the 828th was “badly worn” and that 
due to a lack of parts “they are unable to keep more that 50% of it in operation at any one time.”  
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The status of the 73rd NCB’s equipment was such that they were “able to keep 95% of it in 
operation.”34   
The men of the detachments at Munda continued to show the effects of tropical climate 
and the ever-present mosquito.  The monthly report for November of the 73rd again does not 
have a detailed list of sick bay admittance.  Commander Doane’s attitude toward the presence of 
malaria changed however with the admission that the 73rd had lost 134 men due to death, illness 
or injury since the start of the operation and that “it is noted that nearly 50% of those on sick list 
are malaria cases.”  The lack of screen wire to screen individual crew tents is blamed for the 
majority of the problem with men being “bitten at night while sleeping.” The 24th NCB reported 
1,231 man-days lost during November with 664 of those lost to malaria reflecting the same 
approximate 50% of sick list cases as the 73rd.  The 47th NCB detachment at Munda reported 207 
sick days lost of which 62 were malaria.  Whittaker of the 24th continues his appraisal that his 
battalion was at 60% performance capacity and that they could not maintain their workload with 
rest and rehabilitation.35 
  The 73rd NCB sawmill continued to produce on average 6,000 board feet per day of 
lumber operating on two six-hour work shifts.  Units of the 24th NCB were assigned to assist in 
moving logs to the 73rd sawmill operation.  There was initially a higher output but damage to the 
equipment from large timber and from shrapnel embedded in the trees harvested around Munda 
slowed production.  The men of the 73rd NCB developed an improvised method of detecting the 
shrapnel by using a mine detector to look for shrapnel before the trees were run through the mill. 
 Equipment breakdown and lack of spare parts remained the root of problems.  The 
monthly report for the 73rd continued with the litany of the Munda Seabees that “it is still 
necessary to have someone follow up each requisition personally in order to get the spare parts 
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for equipment without an excessive amount of lost time.”  The lubricating oil situation was still 
causing problems with the lack of 140 SAE oil causing “gears and other parts to become 
crystallized” and without the proper oil they estimated that there was only 2 months useful life 
left in the equipment requiring the heavier oil, specifically the Caterpillar bulldozers, without 
replacing the drives.  It was also noted that the tire situation was getting bad and that without a 
requisition and shipment of motor grader tires, an unusual size tire not standard to the military, 
they would soon be out of operation.  The 73rd and 24th NCB list of equipment down for lack of 
parts stayed virtually unchanged from October to November.36 
A lack of culvert material for drainage projects resulted in the Seabees coming up with 
some original and traditional ways to complete drainage projects around the field and camps at 
Munda.  Initially damaged and excess fuel and oil drums were used for culverts but by 
November the supply of these was used up and the NCBs began building culverts under taxiways 
using dressed lumber and rough logs to build them under roads and driveways.  The amount of 
sawmill production delayed the installation of some drainage projects.  There was a general lack 
of cement and this was noted.  Due to the requests from the 73rd and other NCBs, cement and 
cement molds to cast concrete culverts in the field were added to the standard equipment of an 
NCB after the New Georgia operations.37 
The Munda Bar deepening project was completed in late November with the channel at 
fifteen feet deep to allow the passage of LSTs.  A drilling barge was set up to allow drilling and 
blasting of the coral to deepen the passage through the Munda Bar from fifteen feet to thirty-five 
feet.  It became apparent, however, that there was no dredge available in the South or Southwest 
Pacific area to remove the blasted material from the channel.  Therefore, the 73rd began the 
process of requisitioning cable, high speed drum winches, buckets, and sheaves to build a 
 59
floating drag line to remove the estimated 120,000 cubic yards of material expected to be 
generated by blasting.  The Munda Bar project was placed on hold until such a time as the 
floating drag line could be constructed. 
Construction at Munda – December 1943 
December saw construction of the airfield reach the desired 8,000 feet for heavy bomber 
operations and most of the hardstands and taxiways at useable level for bomber operations.  
Projected completion of all initial airfield construction was on track to be completed by the 
deadline of 15 February 1944.  The 73rd NCB was completing hardstands and camps for all 
aircrews.  The camps for all air crews in the Master Plan were completed in December with the 
exception of the camps for Bomber Command that were on schedule of completion before a 10 
January deadline.  The 73rd also had water treatment and distribution systems set up for the entire 
camp network. In an attempt to allay the continued shortage of metal screen wire to screen 
galleys, heads, and sickbay installation, the 73rd managed to secure a promise from Bomber 
Command to fly in such material to assist with the construction of their own camps.  At the same 
time the 73rd NCB’s Camp Williams still did not have all personnel housed in fully screened 
tents.38 
Sawmill operations for the 73rd remained steady with the same two-shift twelve-hour day 
producing on average 5,000 board feet per day.  The 47th NCB sawmill at Segi also began to 
supply lumber to Munda during December to help with the backlog of projects needing lumber.  
The Munda Bar project was placed on hold until January due to the lack of barges for the crane 
and dragline.  The 47th NCB began a move from Segi Point to Munda, and by the end of 
December, approximately ¾ of the battalion was at Munda where they were at work on 
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improvement of camp facilities for Bomber Command and Naval base headquarters.  The 47th 
NCB completed work on Taxiways “A” and “H” and began to work on hardstand in “E” loop.  
The 24th NCB continued work on road projects and projects involving the construction of 
the Liana Boat Pool, Munda Point Warf, and the Cub 3 hospital.   The 24th NCB also provided 
construction work for numerous Army and Navy projects around the Munda Naval Base 
complex.  On 7 December 1943 the 24th NCB was assigned the task of removing the fifteen-foot 
section of Lambeti Hill to allow for the glide path of bombers approaching Munda from the east 
by the 73rd NCB.  This task was completed by a work detail of ten bulldozers and five 
LeTourneaus carryalls with a capacity of eight cubic yards.  They completed the task of 
removing the required fifteen feet by 16 December 1943.39 
The equipment situation for December began to show some improvement but more from 
a decreasing workload and time for repair than from the arrival of spare parts.  The 25th NCB still 
had six bulldozers down for lack of parts.  The 73rd had eleven pieces of equipment down for 
lack of parts and the 47th had three down for lack of parts. The situation with tires and gear oil 
persisted in December with motor graders for road and airfield maintenance in dire need of tires 
for continued operations. The manpower situation was improving from previous months. The 
24th reported only 283 man days lost in December with 52 being for malaria and the 47th had 305 
man days lost with 31 of those due to malaria.  Commander Doane noted that the number of 
malaria cases in the 73rd was “very small” in December.  The improved health of the units is 
attributed to improved sanitation, improved living quarters, and lessening work schedule.40 
Construction at Munda – January 1944 
The majority of all work on the Munda Airfield was completed and the field was 
considered 99% complete with work on the final Taxiway, “J”, started in January and all airfield 
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work was expected to be finished in February.  The 73rd NCB concentrated its efforts in January 
on the completion of Taxiway “J” and with completing work on Bomber Command housing, 
aviation gasoline storage, and pyrotechnic magazines.  New jobs started by the 73rd NCB were 
the relocation of roadway and drainage at the east end of the airfield, construction of warehouses, 
and the start of drilling on the Munda Bar project.  The 24th NCB continued with road 
maintenance and logging operations to supply the 73rd NCB sawmill. The 24th also supplied 
details to the construction of Army facilities and docking facilities.  The 47th was primarily 
engaged in camp remodeling and building for Army, Navy, and Marine units. 
There is no mention of sick bay status and manpower or equipment status for the 24th 
NCB in January.  The 24th NCB was informed that they were to be rehabilitated and that they 
would be rotated out in March 1944.  The 73rd NCB report for January is equally quiet on status 
of men and equipment.  The 47th NCB reports that their strength is down to 804 men or over 246 
less than the battalion strength in June 1943.  The 47th also does not list status of equipment other 
than to report that a review is underway of equipment status for the next report.41 
Construction at Munda – February 1944 
The 73rd continued with work on the final details of the field and blasting of the Munda 
Bar.  The Material for the dredge barges arrived at Munda on 10 February 1944 and assembly 
was started on the dredge barge.  The 24th NCB was in the process of rehabilitating what 
equipment could be repaired with limited spare parts in preparation for a March departure.  
During February the only task assigned to the 24th NCB was the assembly of the barges for the 
Munda Bar project.  The 47th NCB was primarily responsible for construction of Naval Base 
facilities at Ondonga and the construction of the facilities for the 321st Bomber Group with 
additional projects for Camp Sparks, Pilots Camp, and Naval Base Munda.   
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None of the NCB’s monthly reports indicate sick days or equipment loss for February.  
The 73rd does report being down 160 men and again the blame is “the effects of the strenuous 
(work) program in this hot climate.” The 47th NCB reports being short six ensigns and 330 
enlisted personnel in February and requests these to bring them up to complement.   The units 
continue to complain about lack of spare parts for heavy equipment.  In attempts to make up for 
this the units became very good at improvising parts in battalion machine shops and in 
cannibalizing parts. The 73rd reports that two bulldozers that were out of commission for lack of 
parts for over two months had been scavenged for parts to such an extent that there was “very 
little left of either one of them” and unless requested parts arrived and time was permitted to 
rebuild them they would have to be replaced with new machines.42 
Construction at Munda – March1944 
During March the 73rd NCB completed Taxiway “J” and was running continuous 
operation on maintenance of the Munda Airfield.  The only other airfield construction was the 
compass rose and the addition of fighter hardstands in Taxiway “H” along with the construction 
of additional magazines and roads to access these magazines.  The other major projects of the 
73rd were the Munda Bar project and the construction of facilities for the Bau Island Motor 
Torpedo Base.  The 24th NCB was transferred out to New Zealand for rehabilitation in March 
and their report showed completion of all projects of the 24th NCB by 10 March 1944 with their 
equipment secured and left at Munda to be moved later.  The 47th NCB was tasked with camp 
construction and the operation of the Coral Pit to supply coral for all building and maintenance 
activities including maintenance at Ondonga.  The 47th continued to operate the sawmill at Segi 
Point providing lumber to Munda.   The 47th NCB also supplied diving personnel to assist the 
73rd NCB in blasting the Munda Bar.  With the exception of the opening of the Munda Bar and 
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expanding and modifying existing facilities, all major activity involving airfield construction was 
completed at Munda at this time.  
The 73rd NCB reports in March that it was down by 180 enlisted personnel from full 
complement and was in need of four officers to be fully staffed.  The 47th NCB included a list of 
men injured in March in its monthly reports but there is no report on sick bay admittance, 
although it does mention that illness continues to be a serious issue.  In regard to equipment there 
is more information available.  The 47th NCB included a table of the status of its equipment that 
is very informative and indicative of all the equipment at Munda.  This information included the 
estimated life remaining and the average daily usage and the average time in the field.  For 
bulldozers the average life remaining was estimated at between 6 and 9 months and that was 
assuming the same working condition with proper maintenance and repair parts.  The average 
daily operation was 12 hours per day under severe conditions and the majority of the tractors had 
been in use in the field for twelve months.43 
 The 73rd again detailed the extensive problems with equipment and parts.  Their 
complaint that spare parts were “not being delivered in any quantity” was voiced in some form 
by every NCB.  Commander Doane of the 73rd NCB explained it best, stating that requisitions 
made in the time frame of September through November of 1943 had still not been filled by 
March 1944. The reports stated that 25% of the 73rd NCB’s equipment was inoperable and 
awaiting parts and 40% was operating with parts in need of replacement causing loss of 
productivity and further damage.  The report goes on to state that remaining equipment was “in 
good condition” but good was described with the caveat that the equipment had been in heavy 
use for 8 months in the tropics.  The drive oil situation also continued to be a problem in March. 
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For two months, the units at Munda had 140 SAE oil originally supplied with the 
battalions and the Caterpillar equipment, specifically the D-8 and D-7 bulldozers, performed well 
and “gave little trouble.”  When 90 SAE oil was used, “the gear housing transmissions became 
so hot that the operator was unable to keep his feet on the housing while the equipment was in 
operation.”  The report further states that even though the 90 SAE weight oil was “changed as 
often as additional lubricant could be provided, bearings, raceways, and gears overheated to the 
point they collapsed.”  The Commander pointed out that his most recent information was that no 
more 140 SAE would be supplied by Army Services Command and he warned that his D-8 and 
D-7 bulldozers “will not operate through another two months’ period with 90 SAE lubricant, 
unless the final drives are replaced periodically.”44 
Opening of the Munda Bar – August 1943 - May 1944 
The massive amounts of materials required to operate a bomber command facility and to 
pursue a bombing campaign against Rabaul, the purpose of Operations Toenails capture of 
Munda, required a reliable means of getting these operational supplies of fuel and ordnance to 
Munda.  The channel at Sasavele into the Rovianna Lagoon was deemed unsuitable for large 
transports and it was decided to open the Munda Bar to allow the passage of LST and other 
larger ships directly into Rovianna Lagoon.  This would allow small tankers to be unloaded 
directly at Munda Point Wharf for the Aviation Gas Tank Farm as well as deliver large quantities 
of ordnance and munitions.  
 The initial project involved blasting a fifteen-foot deep channel through the bar some 300 
feet wide by 600 feet long.  This project was begun by the 73rd in August 1943 with the initial 
phase completed in November 1943.  The initial phase managed to achieve a rough depth of 
fifteen feet by blasting away exposed coral heads.  However, blasted material could not be 
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removed from the area and only exposed “coral heads” could be blasted.   The material blasted 
from the exposed heads filled crevices and voids in the Bar.  To achieve a proposed depth of up 
to 35 feet, a method of drilling the coral and removing the spoil material was devised. Equipment 
was requested to put together a drilling barge and to appropriate a dredge to remove blast spoil.  
By November of 1943 it was apparent to the 73rd NCB that there was no dredge available and the 
commander of the 73rd put together a proposal to acquire the equipment necessary to outfit and 
equip a dredging barge.  The drilling barge was assembled and began working in December 
1943.  From the Monthly Report of the 73rd for December 1943 the estimated materiel requiring 
removal for 15 feet of depth was 3,000 cubic yards, for twenty feet of depth approximately 
23,000 cubic yards up to a depth of thirty-five feet requiring 135,000 cubic yards of material to 
dredge.45 
 The drilling barge was constructed of standard 6x12 navy pontoon cells and when 
assembled was forty-three feet wide by 103 feet long and propelled by two inboard engines.  The 
drill barge had three 10-ton cranes located down one side to allow drilling along the entire length 
of the barge.  Each crane was equipped with a “thirty-five foot swinging pile driver leads hung 
from forty foot booms.”  The barge was self contained with air compressors, power generator, 
welding equipment, and diesel stores and was operated by a crew of forty men operating two 
shifts per day.46   
 To anchor the barge in place for drilling required the placement of four dolphins, pile 
anchors, with five piles in each dolphin.  The dolphins were placed, two in line, and forty feet 
from the side of the channel on both sides Munda Bar channel.  This was done because the 
strength of swell resulted in broken anchor cables and moved the 1,500-lb anchors initially used 
to place the barge over the drill site.  These dolphins became the channel markers for the 
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approach to the Munda Bar channel.47  Two-inch pipe was used to punch holes in soft coral 
formations and approximately 80 holes could be put down per 8-hour shift.  In hard coral six-
inch diameter holes were drilled to allow the placement of more dynamite and approximately 
twenty-four to thirty of these holes could be drilled per shift.  Diving operations to place blasting 
charges were carried out by dive rated personnel from all the NCBs at Munda including the 24th 
NCB, 47th NCB, and 73rd NCB that was in overall supervision of the Munda Bar operation. In 
the two-inch hole one-half 50-lb case of dynamite was used and in the six-inch holes between 
two and three cases of dynamite were used per hole. 
 Starting in late March, the task of removing the spoil generated by drilling and blasting 
was turned over to the 47th NCB and removal began in April.  To achieve this, a 25-ton crawler 
crane equipped with a 1-1/2 cubic yard clamshell bucket was mounted on a pontoon barge. It 
was necessary to add 1,000 pounds of ballast to the clamshell to improve its working 
characteristics underwater.  A drag line bucket was initially tried but performance was poor due 
to the rough nature of the channel bottom left after blasting.  The clamshell and crane assembly 
managed to achieve approximately 350 to 400 cubic yards per twelve-hour day of material 
removal.  Material was removed by loading excavated material onto one of two 4x12-pontoon 
cell barges.  Each barge was unloaded by a 70-hp bulldozer at a location approximately ¼ mile 
from the channel.  Eventually a small spoil “island” was created at this location.48 
The final channel through the Munda Bar completed by the end of May was 600 feet long 
and 300 feet wide.  It was approximately eighteen feet deep at low water and required 
approximately 22,000 cubic yards of spoil material to be removed.  This allowed the entrance of 
ships to Munda Pier that was capable of handling two 300-ton vessels at a time with a fifteen-
foot draft.  The opening of Munda Bar greatly increased supply efficiency because material 
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unloaded from ships anchored at Sasavele had to be off loaded onto “landing craft or powered 
flat top pontoons” to be unloaded as Sasavele dock and then loaded onto trucks.  These trucks 
then moved across Sasavele and Roviana Islands to Roviana Dock where the trucks were then 
ferried to Olsen’s Landing which was an approximate nine-mile trip in total.49   
Munda – Conclusion 
The construction of the aviation facilities at Munda Point was a tremendous undertaking.  
It encompassed the work of three US Navy Construction Battalions with the assistance of an 
Army Aviation Battalion and additional units for two Army Engineering Regiments.  It required 
the services of two companies of the 9th “Special” NCB to unload supply ships to keep it 
operational and it required the services of two Naval Construction Maintenance Battalion Units 
(CMBUs), CMBU 561 and 568 to operate after the departure of the 24th and 73rd NCB. The 828th 
Aviation Engineers departed in June 1944 followed by the 73rd NCB in July 1944.  The 47th 
NCB remained at Munda until November 1944.  The Naval Base at Munda was decommissioned 
in May of 1945 one year after the opening of the Munda Bar. 
 The facilities at Munda included an 8,000-foot long runway with seven taxi loops capable 
of supporting heavy bomber operations including “parking on each side for one hundred and fifty 
four-engine aircraft.” Supply and fueling systems were built to allow the operation of the bomber 
and fighter wings of COMAIRSOLS located at Munda.  Housing for over 3,000 Seabees as well 
as over 3,000 army aviation personnel, in addition to Naval Base Munda and Marine Corp 
personnel, were built.   Two hospitals were built and a water supply system capable of supplying 
500,000 gallons per day was constructed.  Unlike at Segi, there is no estimate of the miles of 
road constructed at Munda or of the amount of coral excavated to build it.  The 828th Army 
Engineers estimated that over 50,000 cubic yards of coral was moved and that “over 160,000 
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square yards of surface was stabilized” in regard to the airfield alone.  This value can be easily 
tripled when the road and pier facilities at Munda are considered.  In regard to the 73rd NCBs 
estimate of material moved, they simply state “the Lord alone knows how much dirt and coral 
was moved and hauled.”50 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
AUXILIARY FIGHTER FIELDS 
 
Ondonga 
Plan for Ondonga 
The revised Master Plan for Munda dated 12 July 1943 called for two fighter airfields, 
referred to as Munda Fields No. 2 and No. 3, to be built in the vicinity of Munda.  These fields 
were to be capable of rearming, refueling, and servicing twenty fighter aircraft per hour and were 
to have the capacity of 100 fighter aircraft each by 25 September 1943.  The runways were to be 
completed to 3,500 feet by 100 feet wide by 25 August 1943 and they were to be at 4,000 feet by 
150 feet by 25 September 1943. The spot chosen for placement of these fields was Ondonga 
Island after it was determined that there was no room for these fields in the immediate Munda 
area.  Ondonga is a small island at the head of Hawthorn Sound barely separated from New 
Georgia Island proper.  The construction of the airfield here was assigned to the 82nd and 37th 
NCBs. 
Ondonga – September 1943 
 Due to combat conditions, the area was not secure enough for construction until late in 
August.  The two NCBs were detailed to Ondonga for construction in September with the 82nd 
first on echelon arriving on 10 September 1943.  The 82nd was not at full strength with Company 
“C”, consisting of four officers and 208 men, with a portion of the battalion’s heavy equipment 
having been detailed to Vella LaVella and attached to the 58th NCB.  The units of the 82nd at 
Ondonga consisted of twenty-one officers and 789 enlisted personnel.  Due to the detachment of 
equipment to Vella LaVella and supply issues, the 82nd only had seven bulldozers with them at 
Ondonga. The 82nd started camp construction on 12 September and began work on Ondonga No. 
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1 on 14 September 1943.  By the end of September the 82nd had completed approximately 70% 
of Ondonga No.1 and work was started on approximately 4,222 feet of taxiway, the tank farm, 
and the pilots’ camp.1 
 The 37th NCB did not arrive with the ease of the 82nd NCB.  The 37th arrived in three 
echelons on the 12 September through 15 September.  The first echelon arrived at Ondonga on 
12 September but the second and third echelons arrived first at Munda and were transshipped to 
Ondonga.  All the gear was landed and unloaded at Munda “directly on the beach during which 
time considerable pilfering by other units on the island took place and many valuable supplies 
were lost.”  Commander West, CO of the 37th, expressed great displeasure in this, noting that 
“there should be stronger measures taken by all units of the armed forces to stop the stealing of 
valuable equipment and supplies.”  He notes that he had to post a “guard of approximately 100 
men to endeavor to keep other units from this practice.”  What was especially disturbing was that 
they were “stealing parts and equipment.”2 
The 37th and 82nd divided up work on the Ondonga No. 1, the North Runway, with the 
82nd concentrating on the runway and the 37th NCB working on the center taxiway, north 
taxiway and all road construction.  The 37th also started on the housing, mess hall and water 
system construction.  As of the end of September, the 37th NCB reported the Center Taxiway 
85% complete, the North Taxiway was 35% complete and the Hardstands for the taxiways were 
at 24% complete, while still describing their camp as “temporary in nature”.  The progress was 
not at the deadline originally set at the first revision but was on schedule per the 15 October 
construction deadline given to the battalions at Ondonga.  Both the 37th and the 82nd reported 
heavy rain during September and reported periodic shelling by the Japanese from Kolombangara. 
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Ondonga – October 1943 
By the end of October the 82nd NCB reported that the North strip was completed at 4,200 
feet long by 300 feet wide and work had started on widening the original landing width of the 
strip from 150 feet to 180 feet. They reported that 4,500 feet of taxiway at 150 feet wide with 60 
foot coral paved centers was completed with hardstands for 35 fighter aircraft.  The field was 
also completed with field lighting and the battalion was clearing the approaches to the strip and 
the second strip under construction with the 37th NCB.  Also completed were six 1,000-barrel 
tanks with a 600-foot submarine crossing and a tanker filling station with assistance from the 37th 
and 24th NCBs.  
Other projects completed by the 82nd included the pilots’ camp of thirteen Quonset huts, 
five 16’x48’ framed tents, and a concrete decked mess hall with attached 2,600 square foot 
galley.  The water system included a dug well, a 15,000-gallon storage tank, and three auxiliary 
1,000-gallon storage tanks.   Water was delivered through over 2,000 feet of supply piping. The 
water system was designed for 75,000 gallons of water per day and required chlorinating.  The 
82nd began incinerating “liquid garbage” produced by units based at Ondonga.  The battalion 
sawmill began operation with a production output of approximately 150,000 board feet for 
October.3 
The 37th NCB provides a very detailed list of accomplishments for the month of October.  
The 37th started clearing Ondonga No. 2, the south runway, on 20 September and the runway was 
approximately 42% complete by the end of October.  All taxiways and connections with 
hardstands were completed by the end of October.  A majority of the Building Projects assigned 
to the 37th NCB including dougouts for communications, operations, and ammunition were 
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completed.  The facilities for Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 4, Marine Air Group (MAG) 14, 
and a New Zealand Squadron were also completed by the end of October.  The 37th NCB 
reported 1,768 man hours, or approximately 221 man days, lost to injury and illness in October 
and reported no malaria but the battalion did “actively engage in malaria control work” during 
October.4 
Ondonga – November 1943 
 The majority of the 82nd NCB work force during November was assigned under the 
supervision of the 37th NCB to complete the South Runway.  The 82nd also carried out 
maintenance on the existing field and taxiways.  The battalion cleared large areas of jungle west 
of the field and worked on various malaria control projects in conjunction with the operation of 
its sawmill.  Of an interesting note, the 82nd NCB also provided “landscaping” and “coral paths” 
inside the pilots’ camp as well as installing an underground telephone system and several anti-
malaria projects.  It is of interest to note that this work inside camp coincides with the earlier 
mentioned sanitation inspection that caused General Maxwell to call the sanitation at Navy 
Headquarters at Ondonga very poor and the 82nd NCB camp “excellent.”5 
In the report for November from the 37th NCB, it is noted that during the first six weeks 
of construction there were only five twenty-four hour periods when no rain fell.  These data are 
backed up by the 82nd NCBs battalion history that indicates that during this time frame thirty-five 
inches of rain fell at Ondonga.  The North Runway and hardstands were ready for fighter 
operation on October 18, 1943 and the 37th detailed work on the South Runway.  Figures given 
in the report for November indicate that the South Runway required 135,000 cubic yards of 
excavation prior to the placement of the finished coral surface and approximately 35,000 cubic 
yards of this material had to be blasted prior to removal.  Once this material was removed, 
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approximately 40,000 to 45,000 cubic yards of coral were placed and compacted to make the 
runway and taxiways for the South Runway.  The South Runway was ready for operations on     
1 December 1943 with 140 hardstands complete at Ondonga and another 100 hardstands 
approximately 85% complete.6 
The Commander of the 37th also included an assessment of problems to date in the 
operation.  He goes through the litany of the lack of spare parts and the lack of tires that all the 
other units report.  However, he brings up two points for consideration including the need to plan 
for the first echelon to build roads to the work area to prevent lost time due to bogged down 
equipment.  It is his recommendation for joint battalion operations that would shine some light 
on the construction phase of the airfields at Ondonga.  In regard to supervision and coordination 
between units working on the same project, he states that this “was sadly lacking” at Ondonga.  
He recommended that where one or more battalions were assigned to a single project that “a 
competent, experienced officer be assigned in charge, a man with sound practical construction 
experience, who can forget theory for practicability and speed.”7 
Ondonga – December 1943 Onward 
Major construction was completed on the Ondonga Airfields as of 1 December 1943.  On 
9 December 1943 the 82nd NCB began staging out of Ondonga in a move to Sterling in the 
Treasury Islands.  The last echelon of the 82nd NCB departed Ondonga on 20 December 1943.  
The 37th NCB remained stationed at Ondonga until February 1943 when they departed for Green 
Island.  The 37th performed Maintenance on the field and completed construction of the pilots’ 
and aircrew camp. With the assistance of the Munda Detachment of the 20th NCB, they built a 
landing area and a docking facility referred to as the 37th Dock.  Upon the departure of the 37th 
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NCB, elements of the 47th NCB took over field maintenance at Ondonga and carried out further 
base developments.8 
Vella Lavella 
Construction of aviation and other facilities at Vella Lavella was covered under an 
individual Master Plan for Vella La Vella referenced as CONSOPAC Serial 00695 and dated 15 
August 1943.  This plan called for the construction of a single runway fighter strip near the 
village of Barakoma on the South East coast of Vella Lavella.  Initially the field was to service 
20 fighter aircraft per hour with a projected capacity of 100 fighter aircraft per hour by 15 
October 1943.  The construction was planned as three phases, with the first to complete a runway 
3,500 feet at 100 feet wide within 20 days with the second phase to widen it to 200 feet within 
the first 30 days.  The third phase to extend the 200 foot wide runway to 4,000 feet within 45 
days of start.  Hardstands were to be completed for 100 fighter aircraft with revetments built as 
time and material allowed.  In addition, all facilities for operation of the airfield including 
communications, supply roads, and a aviation gas supply capable of supplying 20 fighter aircraft 
were to be completed within 20 days of start of work.9 
The first revision to the Vella Lavella master plan addressed the completion of 
ammunition belting facility by 25 October 1943 as well as the completion of two, 1,000 barrel 
aviation gas tanks with gravity fill from drum emptying points and gravity flow to truck loading 
points for the same date.  Repair facilities for Acorn 10 were to be completed by 25 October and 
a shop for CASU-3 by 1 November with associated storage to follow by 20 November.  
Additional aviation gas facilities for up to twelve, 1,000 barrel aviation gas tanks with tanker 
filling connections were left under an “as directed” time frame.10 
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The 58th NCB attached to Acorn 10 was set to take part in the landings at Vella and build 
the airstrip.  An advanced survey party of four officers and two enlisted men arrived at Vella by 
Powered Torpedo boat on 12 August 1943.  The main body of the 58th arrived with the invasion 
force on 15 August 1943 near Barakoma Village.  The landing party and the 58th NCB were 
under near constant air attack by the Japanese and on 17 August a ship damaged by Japanese fire 
had to be sunk by American forces causing the loss of some of the 58th NCBs equipment.  The 
third echelon of the 58th landed on 22 August and was bombed while unloading causing several 
casualties including one fatality.11 
Vella Lavella – August 1943 
During first day after the landings at Vella, the 58th “roughed out” nine miles of roads 
with the primary road running from Biloa Mission to Barakoma Village.  In conjunction with this 
activity, the battalion began working on camp facilities with facilities for a sick bay constructed 
first.  These facilities were expanded as the month of August ended and a second camp was 
under construction at the airfield location.  Three days of preliminary surveys were conducted 
and clearing started for the placement of the strip on or about 18 August.  The 58th reported that 
the majority of the trees and underbrush at the field location could be removed by bulldozer, but 
that “about 200 large trees” were of such a size that they could only be felled by blasting.  By the 
end of August, clearing of the airfield location was estimated at 80% complete and final surveys 
for support facilities around the field were at 25% completion.  Completion date for airfield 
operations was designated as 30 September 1943 at the 45-day mark from landing. To assist the 
58th with airfield construction, Company “C” of the 82nd NCB was assigned to Vella under the 
direction of the 58th NCB.  Their activities are reported as part of the progress of the 58th NCB. 
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  The battalion also worked on building the Island Command Post twice.  After the initial 
command post was under construction, it was decided to move the island command post into a 
large cave that the 58th then outfitted with rooms and a 200 yard long stairway connecting the 
cave to the command staff living area.  The 58th also built the Navy Headquarters at Biloa 
Mission including an LST ramp and the blasting of an approach channel through the reef around 
Vella.  In addition to this, the 58th moved and built emplacements of the heavy guns on the island 
and demolished the native village of Barakoma.  In a sad complement to the people whose 
village they had to tear down, the 58th NCB described the village as “sturdily constructed.”12  
Vella Lavella – September 1943 
Construction at Barakoma Field continued at a steady pace and the field was ready for 
flight operations on schedule with 4,000 feet completed at 200 feet wide with the first 
operational landing on 25 September 1943.  Taxiways, dispersal areas, and hardstands for 
twenty-nine aircraft were roughed in and all projects were on schedule for full operation by the 
October deadline set forth in the Master Plan for Vella.  Auxiliary facilities included operations 
dugout and control tower, galleys, and mess halls for operating personnel.  The arrival of the 
battalion sawmill allowed for lumber production starting in September.  The battalion also 
expanded landing facilities at the naval base and deepened the channel through the reef to allow 
for Powered Torpedo Boat Operations. 
The 58th NCB suffered from the same equipment and spare parts issues that plagued the 
operations in New Georgia.  The battalion monthly report indicated that one of the biggest 
problems was that the hardness of the coral was destroying the 12-ply tire on the carryalls.  
However, they noted that they had “obtained” 16-ply tires from the Marines at Vella and that 
these held up far better under the operating conditions there.  The Commander of the 58th also 
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included in his report for September details of the assistance he was provided by his rear echelon 
staff left at Guadalcanal.  This detachment was “extremely useful in procuring items not in the 
battalion’s stock.”  Again, this showed that under most cases, it was necessary to have an officer 
in a rear area to ‘expedite’ the movement of parts and supplies to forward areas.13 
On the 25 September the 77th NCB landed at Vella Lavella during a Japanese attack and 
suffered casualties on the beach during a bombing raid.  The 77th NCB was primarily tasked with 
the building of Hospital facilities in preparation for the Bougainville landings.  They did not take 
part in airfield construction or maintenance.  However, the 77th did take over malaria control 
operations and road building.  The 77th NCB also began the operation of two sawmills to provide 
lumber for building projects on Vella Lavella.14 
Vella Lavella – October 1943 
The North warm-up area was completed by the 58th NCB and work continued on 
taxiways and south warm-up area.  Four dispersal loops with fifty hardstands were in-service by 
the end of October and work on remaining dispersal loops was slowed down.  The work on these 
loops was slowed because of the number of “dry wells and springs” encountered, which required 
“a very comprehensive drainage program” for the area.  This and other delays led the 
Commander of the 58th NCB to acknowledge that his estimation of being able to complete all 
projects assigned by October “turned out to be an over-optimistic estimate.”  
The fueling facilities for Barakoma field were in operation with a 20,000-gallon per day 
capacity.  However, verbal orders were given to the 58th NCB for the construction of an 
“additional ten (10) one thousand (1,000) barrel gasoline tanks and a sea loading line.”  The 
commander noted that an officer had “been assigned to travel through the forward area rounding 
up and shipping forward the necessary materials” to complete this project.  In addition, the spare 
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parts situation for the 58th NCB had also reached the point where they to felt it necessary to 
“have an officer on detached duty endeavoring to procure the necessary spare parts to rehabilitate 
the construction eqipment.”15 
Construction continued on camps and other infrastructures at Vella.  During October 
there were five sawmills in operation at Vella La Vella.  The 58th NCB Sawmill was operating at 
approximately 6,000 board feet per day output, with principle supply going to construction at 
Barakoma.  The 58th NCB had augmented their sawmill by attaching a Gray Marine diesel to the 
unit, replacing the motor that had originally been part of the sawmill package, thereby increasing 
ability to handle heavy timber.  The 77th NCB operated four saw mills, one under their direct 
operation, one under their direction operated by a crew from the 25th NCB, and two under their 
supervision manned by crews from the 53rd NCB.  The majority of the lumber from these 
operations was being stockpiled for movement as part of the Bougainville Campaign.16 
Vella Lavella – November 1943 
The 58th NCB completed the drainage project allowing the completion of the taxiways 
and south warm-up ramp.  The final two dispersal areas were completed, bringing all field work 
to completion with seventy-one hardstands of which sixty-five had revetments.  Parking areas for 
aircraft were completed along the edge of the strip.  The original specification for two aviation 
gasoline tanks was completed and the verbal orders of October had been changed to specify the 
addition of only four more 1,000-barrel gasoline tanks, bringing the total to six tanks with sea 
loading capability.  One of these tanks was under construction and the remaining tanks and sea 
loading line were awaiting supplies and material to arrive.  Other projected projects to complete 
the base at Barakoma were coraling of the rearming area and the construction of a road loop 
north of the strip for additional ammunition storage and bomb dispersal. 
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The 58th does not include a list of men in sick bay and the enclosures for medical reports 
were not available for the 58th NCB.  However, the commanding officer of the 58th requested that 
200 seamen be supplied to the battalion to “replace separations.”  This number of 200 men 
closely resembles the numbers of the other battalions at Segi and Munda for the same time frame 
if numbers of sick and injured are compared.  The situation for obtaining parts remained a 
concern in November and the commander of the 58th broke it down into three distinct problems.  
The first problem was “locating the necessary parts”, the second “was securing possession”, and 
third was “transporting them to the base for use.”17 
During the month of November, the 77th NCB completed assigned work tasks including 
hospitals and over eight miles of roadways complete with bridges.  The operations of the four 
sawmills run by the 77th NCB produced and stockpiled approximately 250,000 board feet of 
lumber.  The 77th NCB prepared for transfer and the first echelon left during early December for 
Bougainville with other detachments remaining to operate logging and sawmill operations until 
early February 1944.18 
Vella Lavella – December 1943 
During December, the 58th performed routine maintenance of the airfield at Barakoma.  
They also completed all six Aviation Gasoline tanks and sea loading line, receiving the first 
tanker with 140,000 gallons of aviation gasoline on 31 December 1943.  Company “C” of the 
82nd NCB departed Vella near the middle of December after completing the bypass road around 
the Acorn 10 Camp.  The 58th then expanded ground and docking facilities at the Naval Base 
including a marine railroad.  The 58th NCB was relieved from duty at Vella and was scheduled to 
depart to New Zealand for rehabilitation in January with all major work complete.19 
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The completion of Barakoma field by the 58th NCB resulted in a tremendous amount of 
earth moving.  Table 5 shows the estimated volumes reported by the 58th NCB in a report dated 
23 December 1943.  The field at Barakoma, when finished, contained sixty-three hardstands with 
revetments and eight without.  The area of the field itself is cleared “water to water” for a length 
of 5,420 feet.  The final length of runway center line was 4,700 feet with 4,300 feet on the East 
Side and 5,000 feet on the West Side.  The cleared width of the area is approximately 650 feet 
with the graded width ranging from 380 feet to 470 feet.  The field had approximately 3,100 feet 
 
Table 5 – Material Quantities for Barakoma Airfield, Vella La Vella 
Runway - 380' wide  
Cut - 63,400  
Earth removed where fill was 
necessary 
Cut - 18,000  
Cut - 81,400 Cu. Yds. 
Taxiways -  
Along Strip - 40' Cut - 10,600  
South Dispersal Area - 60' Cut - 50,000  
South Dispersal Area - Borrowed Fill Fill - 25,000  
North Dispersal Area - 90' Cut - 9,000  
North Dispersal Area - Borrowed Fill Fill - 4,500  
Cut - 69,600 Cu. Yds. 
Fill - 29,500 Cu. Yds. 
SCAT & Plane Parking Areas -  
Fill -  18,500 Cu. Yds. 
Cut - 7,500 Cu. Yds. 
Warm Up Areas  
South End Cut - 15,000  
North End Cut - 20,000  
Cut - 35,000 Cu. Yds. 
Hardstands - Borrowed Fill  
Fill - 1,000 Cu. Yds. 
Revetments  - Borrowed Fill  
Fill - 5,000 Cu. Yds. 
 
Total Cubic Yards of Earth Moved 247,500 Cu. Yds. 
Total Fill 54,000 Cu. Yds. 
Total Cut 193,500 Cu. Yds. 
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of taxiway and 7,535 feet in the South Dispersal Area and 1,300 feet in the North Dispersal Area.  
The Barakoma Airfield had two miles of main road and three miles of secondary roads 
associated with it and was connected to the Naval Base at Biloa Mission by a main road 
approximately twelve miles in length. The material quantity of 247,000 cubic yards moved does 
not take into account all material for roads and camps.  It also labels 18,000 cubic yards of fill as 
“earth removed where fill was necessary”.  This probably means that some of that 18,000 cubic 
yards removed was replaced with compacted fill.  This changes the value for the total fill back to 
around 72,000 cubic yards of fill.  Taking into account the road construction and camp area, the 
value could again approach the neighborhood of 150,000 cubic yards of fill.20 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The Lessons Learn by the Seabees in the Solomon Islands 
 The TOENAILS campaign of 1943 was implemented to capture New Georgia to advance 
Allied power, specifically Allied air power, ever closer to the ultimate objective of Operation 
CARTWHEEL, the neutralization and capture of the Japanese base at Rabaul in the Bismarck 
Archipelago.  To build those airfields, the Allies had to first take the islands from the Japanese.  
The story of the military conquest is an entirely different narrative from what this work has 
examined but this is nonetheless a combat narrative.  The Allies built those airfields in battle 
with the powerful forces of nature, at times, simultaneously in physical battle with the Japanese. 
The primary combatants for the Allies were the Naval Construction Battalions, known as 
the Seabees, and their United State Army counterparts.  Their enemies at New Georgia were 
many, and were frequently silent and invasive.  They ranged from battle with the Japanese 
Imperial Army and Navy to offensives against the dangers of some of the densest tropical 
jungles on earth, including omnipresent mud, infestations of disease ridden insects, and the hot 
and humid weather of the equatorial Pacific.  But perhaps the most surprising and insidious 
enemy was the United States military bureaucracy itself and its logistical supply system.  The 
shear size and complexity of the operation brought numerous logistical problems to surface, 
resulting in the failure to supply needed parts or the supply of inappropriate parts. 
 What is known about the Japanese Imperial forces is not always as straightforward as is 
explained in the services history, but in regard to the Seabees their effect is the easiest to assess.  
The damage done on the beaches of Rendova to the 24th NCB claimed the greatest loss of life to 
the Seabees in a single incident. It would not be exceeded until the landings at Iwo Jima.  Even 
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then, it was not just the bombs themselves, but the constant threat of bombs, artillery, and snipers 
that had to be dealt with.  The loss of life experienced by the Seabees at Rendova, Munda, and 
Vella La Vella was in most instances the tragic fact of war although in a few instances it was a 
tragedy “that could have been avoided.”1  
The Lessons from the Japanese 
It goes almost without saying that when an air raid siren sounds ‘condition red’ you dive 
for the nearest cover, be it a fox hole, a dug out, or the ground between the two stacks of 
dynamite being unloaded from a landing craft.  As was stated earlier, the men of the 24th NCB 
felt the most dangerous job was the unloading of supplies, especially fuel, explosives, and 
munitions, on the beach.  The bombings took a serious toll, but in the estimation of the Seabee 
commanders and the men it was the threat of bombing and the continual use of ‘condition red’ 
that led to the greatest loss of productivity.  The unrelenting stress of combat combined with the 
heat and the strenuous work just wore men out.  The incessant false alarms, missed alarms, and 
the unheard alarms added significantly to their state of mental fatigue. 
The almost unanimous consensus of the NCB reports from the New Georgia Campaign 
were that the air raid warning system, especially during the early phase, ranged from inadequate 
to utterly ineffective.  Alarms sounded constantly at night in some places, with many being false, 
and at other times camps were blindsided by attacks because alarms failed to sound.  The men 
could not make the assumption that an alarm was false, making sleep a tenuous and often 
disturbed entity.  Perhaps worse from the men’s point of view were these late or missed 
warnings.  As was the case with the 47th NCB on the night of 28 September 1943, the bombs fell 
as the air raid warning sounded giving the men no time to seek cover.  In response to this, all the 
battalions not only complained of inadequate air raid warnings, they all devised some battalion 
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controlled method of taking responsibility for their own air raid warnings, including posting men 
to listen and watch for bombers at night.  Ironically, one of the most consistent false alarms that 
caused disruption of progress for a few days was caused by a local jungle parrot that learned to 
imitate the battalion’s air raid siren in the vicinity of battalion command.  It seemed even the 
jungle could fight back. 
Another action taken in regard to the air raid situation addressed a problem unique to the 
construction trades.  During the early days of the operation, there were numerous injuries and 
loss of equipment to air raids because the heavy equipment operators could not hear the 
‘condition red’ signal.  Some of the early requests to the Bureau of Yards and Docks were for the 
battalions to be outfitted with their own portable self-powered air raid sirens that were loud 
enough to be heard by equipment operator over the noise of a bulldozer or carryall engines.  This 
particular set of requests was not answered with more equipment but was acknowledged as a 
problem, a problem that the Seabees learned to overcome in the field.  The basic response of the 
battalions at New Georgia that was quickly adopted by all the battalions present was to develop 
their own method of signaling their operators depending upon their assigned mission and 
location.  This usually involved a set of visual signals, flags, or lights to let equipment operators 
unable to hear the air raid siren to know to seek cover for themselves and their equipment.  
  It would be unfair to say the Seabees did not learn anything about construction from the 
Japanese, or that the Japanese learned nothing from the Seabees.  However, it was far more a 
lesson for Japanese than for the Seabees. The Seabees were less than impressed with what they 
found at Munda as far as Japanese construction, even accounting for the level of bombing it had 
absorbed.  As described previously, the Japanese did almost everything by hand with picks, 
shovels, and baskets.  What little equipment they had were light trucks for moving supplies and 
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rollers for smoothing and dressing the finished runway surface.  The Seabees quickly learned 
that they far surpassed their adversaries in construction. Commander Joseph Blundon, who 
commanded Seabees at Guadalcanal, was famous for stating that the Seabees could build more in 
a day than their Japanese counterparts could build in a month and that “one Seabee operating a 
12 cubic yard scraper can move as much dirt in a day as 150 Japanese laborers.”2  In essence the 
Seabees learned that Commander Blundon was right.  At best, the average laborer with pick, 
shovel, and basket can move 1.5 cubic yards a day in such heat and humidity giving those 150 
men the ability to move 225 cubic yards per day.  This is the equivalent of 1 ½ loads for a 12 
cubic yard scraper every hour during a twelve-hour day.  Those scrapers could actually be turned 
around as fast as every twenty minutes in most situations and there were usually eight scrapers of 
between 8 and 12 cubic yard capacity per battalion.  The Japanese learned that they needed to 
emulate the construction practices of the Seabees; however, they were never successfully able to 
do this during the war.  The Allies learned they were doing it right, even with problems, because 
imitation was the best form of flattery. 
What the Seabees Learned about Themselves 
 Not all men are created equal when it comes to physical labor.  This is something we all 
learn as we age and try to move the same number of cement bags at forty that we could at 
twenty-two.  Age was one of the factors that took a heavy toll on the battalions at New Georgia.  
The lower numbered battalions were formed earlier in 1942 and 1943, and they held a 
comparatively high number of older men, even in Seabee terms.  The Seabees as a group were 
older than the other units in respective service branches due to the nature of the men recruited.  
These were professional craftsmen and equipment operators who left skilled well paying jobs in 
the states to build these bases and as in the nature of many trades, your most skilled tradesmen 
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are not men in their twenties.  It was one of the harshest lessons learned, especially by the 24th, 
47th, and to some extent the 73rd NCB, that the conditions on New Georgia were too extreme for 
men much past their 30s to handle. 
 The commanders of various battalions used phrases ranging from those who ‘just 
couldn’t take it’ to a direct assessment that this work was too much for ‘men over 40’.  The 
incredible pace of work in the subequatorial heat and humidity combined with the lack of sleep 
caused by air raids and atrocious living conditions wore men out, especially those with pre-
existing conditions.  It was even speculated that some would have been excluded from service in 
any other type of military unit but their experience and aquired skills brought them to the 
Seabees.  Those men that the conditions did not wear out completely were frequently weakened 
to the point where they became vulnerable to the multiple diseases rampant in parts of New 
Georgia. 
 Malaria and other tropical disease took a heavy toll at Segi and Munda on men and 
productivity.  This came from numerous reasons that varied with the location, including the fact 
that Segi and Munda are on the leeward side of New Georgia.  All the Seabee commanders 
considered lack of proper insect screening a major problem and when the Seabees requisitioned 
insect screening, they always asked for wire mesh screening.  The lack of availability of 
screening combined with the inadequacy for long-term tropical use of the standard canvass tents 
supplied for battalion use was also commented on as a contributing factor to illness.  These men 
operated equipment from dawn to dusk and into the night, often exposing them during the most 
active part of the day for mosquitoes, then slept in tents with nonexistent, inadequate or damaged 
screening and ate in mess halls open to the air.  These situations improved as the men most 
susceptible were transferred out and as the sanitation improved.  Malaria control measures and 
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camp construction and sanitation became work-listed priorities equal with airfield construction 
and maintenance as work progressed, vastly improving the living and working conditions and 
lowering the rates of illness. 
The lessons learned in regard to the men and the health of the battalions are tied directly 
to the lessons of bombing and the lessons learned on supply.  Simply put, exhausted men can’t 
work effectively regardless of the reason for the exhaustion.  Several commanders, and 
specifically the commander of the 47th NCB, recommended that the physical requirements be 
raised for the Seabees in light of the experience on New Georgia.  In one instance, the tropical 
conditions aggravated men with existing tooth problems so severely that over ten men were 
relieved of duty because of dental disease.  Men with pre-existing problems and men who could 
not handle minimal sleep and twelve to eighteen hour days in tropical climate were not needed.  
To take care of those men who could handle the strain, a better system of warnings to allow them 
what rest could be granted was coupled with improved designs for camp setup and drainage with 
anti malaria control work prioritized earlier in the construction phase.  The elevation of camp and 
malaria control projects to the equivalence of airfield construction priorities benefited all 
personnel at the base. 
What the Seabees Learned about Equipment 
Perhaps the Solomon Islands and New Georgia campaigns were responsible for a 
problem that has plagued American industry and purchasing habits for over a half century now.  
A fundamental lesson of this campaign was that bigger is better.  While that may not be a wise 
choice in a 21st century economy, at New Georgia in 1943, it was proven, time and time again, 
that bigger equipment could indeed do a better and faster job.  The battalions liked the 
LeTourneau 8 cubic yard carryalls until they received the 12 cubic yard models, at which time 
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the 8 cubic yard model became “too light”.  They all loved the D-7 and D-8 Caterpillars because 
the bigger bulldozer had the power and mass needed to do the job quickly.  They could move 
more material faster with larger tractors than with smaller.  This was also true with power 
shovels and cranes where the larger shovels could break up coral for loading without having to 
resort to dynamite. 
Bigger was not necessarily a case for pure size.  With regard to the capacity of a carry all, 
size was the key factor, but often it was the phrase “too light” that accompanied a complaint 
about a particular machine that was truly the problem.  The larger machines were physically 
heavier and the extra mass allowed them to work the dense coral, which unlike stateside soil, 
could be as hard as concrete at times.  The extra mass and engine power, referred to as ‘crowding 
power’, also allowed the machines to be used in the extremely heavy mud and organic 
overburden that had to be removed to allow placement of the coral foundation.  Smaller 
machines had their uses but certain features and types of machine were preferred.  The 
commander of the 24th NCB considered it a necessity of any tractor used in jungle conditions to 
be equipped with a winch.  It was also not just earth moving equipment involved in the size 
issue.  Designed for American soft and hardwoods, the sawmill units furnished to the battalions 
were undersized for cutting mahogany and other tropical hardwoods whose logs could be six feet 
in diameter or larger.  Whatever the equipment, large and specialized equipment came with its 
own set of problems. 
The Lessons of Supply and Transportation 
 The very first problem involving supply and transportation is that you have to get there.  
In the initial landings, the size of certain machines caused problems because pre-landing plans 
were disrupted when LST commanders refused to load large bulldozers and shovels saying they 
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were ‘too big.’  These same pieces of equipment were later delivered in the same landing craft so 
obvious and negative assumptions were made by Seabee commanders as to why their equipment 
was not loaded.  There was a prevalent recommendation for future operations that landing craft 
commanders not be allowed to change or influence loading plans or reject loading of equipment 
needed for the job based on the commander’s opinion of convenience.  The landings at Rendova 
and the difficulties thereafter led to several changes in the loading of assault craft for the forward 
movement of NCBs. 
The sheer mass of equipment wasn’t the only issue.  Transportation, parts, and the 
movement of parts were the most critical elements in the efficiency of construction at New 
Georgia.  The lack of spare parts is the gospel of the New Georgia Campaign.  It does not matter 
which battalions’ records are examined, the same complaint arises in all of them.  The mystique 
of the Seabees, that they could manufacture spare parts from almost nothing, is largely true 
because they had no other choice in many cases.  The commander of the 58th NCB broke the 
parts problem down to the three basic components of finding the part, acquiring the part, and 
transporting the part to base. 
Finding parts was difficult.  As late as March 1944, commanders were still complaining 
that parts requested in September 1943 were not yet delivered.  There was a tremendous 
disconnect in the initial phase of the New Georgia Campaign between the amount of equipment 
tasked to the New Georgia and the amount of support material sent to keep that material 
operational.  Some of the problems were from unexpected oversight.  The prime example of this 
is road patrol, or road grader, tires.  They used a size not commonly used by the United States 
military and therefore not stocked or ordered in quantity, meaning they became extremely 
difficult to find, thereby limiting road patrol operation.  The most common parts problem was 
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caused by the unexpected amount of wear because of unfamiliarity with construction in extreme 
heat and against coral.  Coral and coral dust wore out parts, tires, and tracks at a faster rate than 
stateside soils especially on the light machines.  Supplies were moved forward in quantity to rear 
area supply depots at Nouemea, New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, but these 
quantities were not available until early 1944 when these units were re-equipping for forward 
moves. 
The most egregious oversight in parts was an intra service conflict.  The United States 
Army Services of Supply was in charge of supplying parts and materials to the forward base 
areas, including fuel and oil for all the service branches.  The requirement of Caterpillar heavy 
tractors, including those being operated by Army Aviation Engineers, required special weight oil 
for high temperature operating conditions.  After the initial supply ran out, the Army Services 
Command would not ship the heavy oil stating that all-purpose oil would be adequate.  This led 
to a continuous barrage of complaints and requests to the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks to get the appropriate material.  Assurance that the situation would be addressed and the 
proper material acquired came after May 1944 in time for future moves of these battalions but at 
the expense of otherwise unnecessary repairs to final gear drives on the affected heavy tractors.  
Similar problems were caused by the lack of shipping.  The general lack of freight-
moving capacity was blamed for much of the delay in delivering parts, both to the rear base areas 
and for distribution to forward areas.  Once parts were found and acquired, moving them 
required finding space on transportation geared mainly at delivering supplies for aviation 
operations.  In some cases NCB commanders had aviation units, especially Bomber Command, 
bring in supplies and equipment necessary to complete Bomber Command camps and facilities.  
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The lack of 80-octane gasoline, not needed for aviation, also led to equipment problems with 
battalions diluting aviation gasoline to operate equipment. 
Acquiring the parts, though second on the 58th NCB’s list of problems, was the most 
difficult of the parts related tasks.  Once the part was located, it had to be “acquired.”  This led to 
the most irritated comments involving the dilemma over spare parts.  It was universally 
recognized by the Seabee commanders that in order to locate and acquire parts, an officer would 
have to be placed “on detached duty” in the rear area to “acquire” the parts.  Some tried sending 
non-commissioned personnel and some used their rear echelon staff if available, but they all 
recognized and were dismayed and irritated by the necessity of having to send an officer to 
perform this function.  This lost the battalion a forward officer and it is of interest to note that the 
standard compliment of an NCB changed from twenty-seven to thirty-three officers over the 
course of the New Georgia Campaign, possibly to adjust for rear area demand. 
The Move Forward 
By the conclusion of the New Georgia Campaign and close of Operation TOENAILS, the 
war had moved on. Naval Base Munda was decommissioned in May of 1945, a year after its 
completion.  For the United State Naval Construction Battalions who built the facilities there the 
lessons learned had been both painful and rewarding.  With the experience gained at New 
Georgia, heavier equipment would move in faster and more efficiently on the next move 
forward.  The very first priority was to set up the access roads and encampments so that work 
could proceed on the airfields without loss of time because of supply and manpower issues for 
both the Seabees and the flight crews due to swamp roads of mud and unhealthy camps.  And 
though the problems of transportation remained, and will always remain in a war zone, after New 
Georgia the rear areas were well supplied with parts and massive repair yards to handle the 
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equipment.  The Solomon’s were the proving ground for the men and machines that went on to 
build the fields at Tinian and on Okinawa.  The American people may remember the ingenuity of 
the Seabees and the courage of their John Wayne image.  Yet, it was the ability to literally move 
mountains, 100,000 cubic yards or more at a time, in places where most men couldn’t work for 
an hour without collapsing that truly makes their slogan of ‘Can Do’ a legend. 
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New Zealand Forces assisted/supplemented US naval forces. 
 
Woodbury, David O. Builders for Battle: How the Pacific Naval Air Bases were Constructed. 
New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1946. 
 
If this text were less useless for the purpose of my thesis I would be amazed.  It is 
supposed history written like a south sea travel journal.  I’m very glad it doesn’t cover the 
Solomons.  
 
 
Published Movie and Video Sources 
 
The Fighting Seabees.  Dir. Edward Ludwig.  Perf. John Wayne, and Susan Hayward. Republic 
Pictures Corp., 1944. 
 
This movie staring John Wayne is probably the way the Seabees are most remembered by 
people along with the Seabees portrayal in Oscar and Hammerstein’s South Pacific.  Vice 
Admiral Moreell supported the production of this movie and his second in command was 
assigned as a technical advisor to the movie.   
 
South Pacific. Dir. Joshua Logan. Perf. Rossano Brazzi, Mitzi Gaynor, Juanita Hall, Ray 
Walston, and John Kerr. 20th Century Fox, 1958. 
 
 The image of Ray Walston as Billis (a Seabee Chief Petty Officer) singing There is 
Nothin’ Like a Dame is probably more the image that most Americans have of the Seabees than 
Wayne’s portrayal in The Fighting Seabees. 
  
Home for the Seabees. Per. John Wayne.  Navy No.: MN-11727.  United States Navy, 1977. 
 
The film Home for the Seabees is a documentary about the Seabees and their Home Base 
at Port Hueneme, California produced in 1977.  It was the last motion picture John Wayne made 
before his death in 1979.  Wayne had a long-term involvement with the Seabees since making 
the Fighting Seabees in 1944 and was their unofficial spokesman.  The only copy I have ever 
seen of this film is at the Seabee Archives and Museum at Port Hueneme.  
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